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INTRODUCTION

What is the “canon” of family law? By canon, I mean the ways of thinking about family
law that are widely shared by legal scholars and especially by legal authorities, like legislators
and judges. The existing literature on canons, which has long centered on the literary canon and
has recently turned to the constitutional law canon,1 has most commonly understood a canon to
be a set of foundational texts that exemplify, guide, and constitute a discipline.2 In part, the
family law canon tracks this traditional focus on the inclusion and exclusion of texts, even if the
family law canon does not take the form of a short and definitive reading list. Some of the

1

For some of the scholarship on the literary canon, see H A R O LD B L OO M , T HE W E S TE R N C A N O N : T H E
B O O K S AN D S CHOOL OF THE A GES (1994); H E N R Y L OUIS G ATES , J R ., L OOSE C A N O N S: N OTES ON THE C ULTURE W ARS
(1992); L AWRENCE W . L E V IN E , T HE O PENING OF THE A M E R IC A N M IN D : C A N O N S, C ULTURE, A N D H ISTORY (1996).
For some of the scholarship on the constitutional law canon, see L EGA L C ANONS 331-433 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson eds., 20 00); J.M . Balkin & Sanfo rd Le vinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 H ARV . L. R EV . 963
(1998); David Fo ntana, A Case for the Twen ty-First Century Con stitutional Cano n: Schneiderman v. U nited States,
35 C O N N . L. R EV . 35 (2 002 ); Jerry G oldm an, Is There a Canon of Constitutional Law?, 2 LA W & P O L. B OOK R EV .
134 (1992); Sanford Le vinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 CH I.-K ENT L. R EV . 1087 (199 3);
David E . Marion, The State of the C ano n in C onstitutional La w: Lesson s from the Ju rispruden ce of John Ma rshall,
9 W M . & M A R Y B ILL R TS . J. 385 (2001 ); Richard A . Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 D UKE
L.J. 243 (199 8) [hereinafter Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent]; W illiam J. Rich, Taking “Privileges
or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 M INN . L. R EV . 153 (2002); Gerald N.
Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The E ndless Attempt to C anonize a Ca se, 80 V A . L. R EV . 161
(1994); Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. R EV . 383
(2000); Symp osium , The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST . C O M M E N T . 187 (2000); Richard P rimus, The
Can on H as a H istory, 14 Y ALE J.L. & H UMAN . 221 (2002 ) (reviewing LEGA L C A N O N S (J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson eds., 2000)). For some of the scholarship on legal canons more generally, see LEGA L C A N O N S, supra, at 3328 ; Judith R esnik, Constructing the Canon, 2 Y ALE J.L. & H UMAN . 221 (1990); Judith R esnik, Revising the Canon:
Fem inist Help in Teaching Pro cedure, 61 U. C IN . L. R EV . 118 1 (1993 ); Symp osium , Multiple Cultures and the Law:
Do We Have a Legal Canon?, 43 J. L EGA L E D U C . 1 (1993).
2

See, e.g., B L OO M , supra note 1, at 15 (“[T]he Canon’s true question remains: What shall the individual
who still desires to read attemp t to read , this late in history?”); G ATES , supra note 1, at 32 (“Our task will be to bring
together the ‘essential’ texts o f the canon, the ‘crucially central’ authors, tho se who m we feel to be indisp ensab le to
an und erstand ing of the shape, and shaping, of the tradition .”); Fontana, supra note 1, at 37 n.10 (“I use the term
‘canon’ throughout this Article in the way the term tradition ally has been used in d iscussions of the legal ‘can on.’ A
canon is the collection of the most important or illuminating items in a particular field. A canon is the collection of
impo rtant cases.”) (citation omitted); Go ldma n, supra note 1, at 134 (“Does constitutional law have a canon? By
‘canon’ I mean a widely accepted body of rules, principles, and norms exemplified in a common set of Supreme
Court opinions.”); Marion, supra note 1, at 387 (“[A] number of legal scholars have been openly considering
whether it makes sense to speak of a constitutional law canon, a set of defining or formative cases that should shape
the study and d iscussion of co nstitutional law.”); P rimus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, supra note 1, at
243 (“Several legal theorists have recently explored the idea that constitutional law has a canon, a set of greatly
authoritative texts that abo ve all others shape the nature and d evelo pme nt of constitutional law.”); Snyder, supra note
1, at 385-86 (“The constitutional canon is the set of foundational texts that undergird our socio-legal discourse,
influencing the way academics, judges, policymakers, and political commentators think about constitutional law.”).

shared ways of thinking about family law address which official legal sources, such as statutes
and judicial decisions, fall within family law and which fall outside of it. But canons are not
necessarily limited to texts like cases and statutes.3 Stories and examples can also be part of a
canon. In fact, there is widespread agreement among legal authorities and legal scholars that
certain stories and examples explain and describe family law and its governing principles. The
family law canon consists of both official legal sources and these stories and examples.
No one has examined family law as a field that might have a canon. Yet the family law
canon importantly determines what counts as family law, what constitutes a good reason or a
convincing argument in a family law debate, what explanations have to be given, and what does
not have to be explained. The family law canon operates, moreover, at the level of common
sense, powerful enough that its tenets are taken to require no reappraisal. Indeed, the family law
canon casts stark light on a feature of canons that has been given too little attention in the
scholarship on the literary canon and even in the scholarship on the constitutional law canon: the
practical consequences that a canon can have in the world. The family law canon, for example,
has enabled state legislatures and state courts enacting and defending changes in divorce law to
contend that family law no longer supports women’s inequality and so no longer needs to worry
about women’s position upon divorce. The family law canon has allowed courts, judges, judicial
organizations, congressmen, and legal scholars to mount powerful and effective campaigns
against federal statutes simply on the ground that the statutes constitute federal family law and

3

A few scholars describing can ons other than the fam ily law canon have b egun to reco gnize this. Most
prominently, Balkin and Levinson note that the constitutional law canon includes “characteristic forms of legal
argument, characteristic approaches to problems, underlying narrative structures, unconscious forms of
categorization, and the use o f canonical examp les.” B alkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 970. For other definitions
of “canon” not limited to texts, see Fran Ansley, Recognizing Race in the American Legal Canon, in L EGAL
C A N O N S, supra note 1, at 238, 242 (“I will approach the legal canon in a way that cuts across various kinds of
materials and audiences, focusing on its role as a source of cultural literacy, a collection of core narratives (or ‘stock
stories’) that Americans tell themselves about the nation’s history and its system of law.”) (footnote omitted); Carol
M. Rose, Canon s of Prope rty Talk, or, Blackstone’s An xiety, in L EGA L C A N O N S, supra note 1, at 66, 67 (“Instead of
discussing particular cases, treatises, or texts as the canon of property law, . . . I propose to take up as ‘canonical’ the
strategies for property talk that Blackstone so interestingly prefigured. By calling them canonical, I mean that
despite some ebbs and flows, each of these strategies has enjoyed a certain constancy over time. They are canonical
too in the sense that the adherents to each seem confident of the foundations of their own respe ctive perspectives,
regarding the m as the more or less unproblematica lly prop er stance for discussing property.”); Mark T ushnet, The
Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST . C O M M E N T . 187, 18 7 (2000) (“Any discipline has a
cano n, a set of themes that organize the way in which p eop le think ab out the discipline.”); see also A N T H O N Y G.
A M S TE RD A M & J EROME B RUNER , M INDING THE L AW 287-88 (2000) (“[R]esults in the law . . . . are influenced . . . by
how peop le think, categorize, tell stories, deploy rhetorics, and make cultural sense as they go about interpreting and
applying rules, requirements, and theories.”).
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are supposedly unprecedented and inappropriate for that reason alone. The family law canon has
permitted courts and Congress to avoid explaining why the law employs very different rules to
regulate the familial rights and responsibilities of the poor.
The silence about the family law canon does not indicate the absence of a family law
canon, but it does reflect more general trends in the work of academic theorists. Academic
theorists have devoted much less attention to family law than they have spent on thoroughly
examining legal subjects like constitutional law.4 Academic theorists have also frequently
written about legal canons as if they emanate only from prestigious, powerful, centralized, and
federal institutions like the United States Supreme Court.5 These theorists may have ignored the

4

As many family law scho lars and family law casebooks have noted , family law has relative ly low status in
the legal academy and the legal profession, particularly when compared to an extremely high status field like
constitutional law. In many respects, the low status of family law is puzzling, given the sheer volume of family law
cases, the importance of family law in structuring people’s lives and interaction with the legal system, and the goods
(monetary and psychological) at stake. See, e.g., L ESLIE J. H ARRIS & L EE E. T E IT E LB A U M , F A M IL Y L AW , at xxxv (2d
ed. 2000 ) (“[S]o me stud ents ma y bring a bias against [family law] because it does not enjoy the prestige of, say,
antitrust— although the total number o f antitrust cases in one year m akes up a go od d ay’s work in an urban dom estic
relations court.”); W ALTER O. W EYRAUCH ET AL., C A S ES A N D M A T ER IA LS O N F A M IL Y L AW : L EGA L C O N C E PT S AN D
C HANGING H U M A N R ELATIONSHIPS 1 (1994) (“W hile [family law] is a course that students like to study, many
consider it less difficult and less serious than courses in commercial law, constitutional law, or taxation. Some
consider family law a ‘marginal’ course rather than part of the ‘core ’ curriculum.”); Martha M inow, “Forming
Underneath Everything that Grows:” Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 W IS . L. R EV . 819 , 819 (“Fam ily law is
. . . ‘underneath’ other areas of the law. Its low status within the profession is well-known.”).
5

The deb ate on the constitutional law canon, for example, has largely centered on the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. One article in the literature on the constitutional law canon, for instance, tracks the
Supreme Court cases that appear in the most constitutional law case boo ks. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 134-35
(finding that eleven constitutional law casebooks all include the following ten Supreme Court cases as principal
cases: Brown v. Board of Education, Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, Garcia v. SAMTA, Gibbons v. Ogden,
Loch ner v. New York, McCulloch v. Maryland, Marbury v. Madison, New York Times v. United States, and
Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer). Other articles explore the canonical or anti-canonical status of particular
Supreme Court cases. See Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, supra note 1, at 250 (“Any theory of
canonical dissent must account for Holmes’s dissent in Lochner and Harlan’s dissent in Plessy. To those two I
would add the set of free sp eech dissents by Justices Holmes and Brandeis.”); Ro senberg, supra note 1, at 171
(“W hy is defending the efficacy of Brown so imp ortant? T he answer, I think , is that Brown is the symbol of the use
of courts to produce significant social reform. It provides legitimacy and a sense of purpose to liberal-leaning legal
acad emics.”) (foo tnote o mitted); Snyder, supra note 1, at 384 (“Any modern judge or legal scholar who does not
agree that Brown was co rrectly decide d is considered a crackpot.”); Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal
Education, 43 J. L EGA L E D U C . 22, 26 (1993 ) (“[A]n app roach to co nstitutional interpre tation is unacceptable if it
entails the incorrectness of Brown v. Board of Education.”). Still more articles nominate a Supreme Court case to be
add ed to the constitutional law canon. See Fontana, supra note 1, at 37 (“Schneiderman v. United States should be a
part of the constitutional law canon, as it is a good case to teach in any point in history.”) (footnotes omitted);
Sanfo rd Le vinson, Why the Canon Shou ld Be Expanded to Include The Insular Cases and the Saga of American
Expansion ism, 17 CONST . C O M M E N T . 241, 243 (20 00) (“The Insular Cases deserve an important place within each
of [the constitutional law] canons . . . .”) (footnote omitted). For an argument that the constitutional law canon
devotes too much attention to S upreme C ourt opinions, see B alkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1003-06.
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family law canon because they incorrectly assumed—ironically, because of the power of the
family law canon itself—that an institution like the Supreme Court has played little role in the
development of family law.
This Article examines the family law canon, analyzes the consequences of the way that
the canon is constructed, and explores how contesting the canon’s construction might make a
difference in practical terms. As it reveals, legislatures, courts, and legal scholars have created
the family law canon, and the family law canon has in turn shaped how these legal authorities
and scholars think about family law, and how they teach their students and successors to view the
field. Legislatures and courts have the most influence over the family law canon because they
affect family law most directly. Their work has inherent and independent legal force, regardless
of whether legal scholars or practicing lawyers endorse or approve of it.6 Legal scholars, in turn,
influence the family law canon through their scholarship and their teaching. The academic
community’s scholarship helps to create, promulgate, and reinforce the widely shared ways of
thinking about family law, and legal scholarship can influence legislatures and courts. Legal
scholars also help to form and perpetuate the family law canon through their family law courses
and their family law casebooks that structure the content and focus of many family law courses.7
How family law is taught—what is included and excluded, what stories are told about family law
and what examples are used—helps determine how the next generation of lawyers, including

6

In this way, legal canons differ from literary canons. The content of the literary canon is primarily in the
hand s of literature scho lars who decid e what they will teach and write ab out. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1,
at 1001 (“Liberal arts scholars have more control over the academic theory canon of their discipline than do legal
academics. They teach the courses, assign the books, and become the arbiters of quality and taste in intellectual
production and in significant parts of ‘high culture.’ . . . [C]onstitutional law professors have much less control over
the content of the academic theory canon of their discipline. This canon is largely shaped and controlled by forces
beyo nd their direct contro l — the courts and the po litical bran ches.”); Paul D. Carringto n, Tea ching American Civil
Procedure Since 1779, in L EGA L C A N O N S, supra note 1, at 155, 155 (“[W ]e have considerably less freedom than
teachers of literature, for the reason that there is but one law applicable to the deeds and misdeeds of our fellow
citizens, and it is not made, selected , or necessarily approved by us, and our students know that.”); O wen M . Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN . L. R EV . 739, 746 (19 82) (“There can be m any schools of literary
interpretation, but as Jordan Flyer put it, in legal interpre tation there is only one school and attendance is
mandatory.”); see also G ATES , supra note 1, at 32 (noting that “scholars” and “writers” make literary canons).
7

In their work on the constitutional law canon, Balkin and Levinson distinguish between constitutional
law’s “‘pedagogical canon,’” the “key cases and materials [that] should be taught in constitutional law courses and
reprinted in constitutional law casebooks,” and constitutional law’s “‘academic theory canon,’” the “key cases and
materials any serious leg al academ ic . . . should know and any serious theory of constitutional law must take into
acco unt.” B alkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 975-76. This distinction between a pedagogical canon and an
academic theory canon does not appear to be present in family law.
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some future legal authorities and legal scholars, will understand family law and its guiding
principles.
At present, the family law canon misdescribes both the content of family law and its
governing principles. The family law canon distorts how legal authorities and legal scholars
understand family law in a way that can distort their judgments about specific family law
disputes. Challenging the family law canon’s construction—opening to scrutiny and question
what is now taken to be a matter of common sense—can reorient our perspective on family law
and our ways of thinking about the field. It is the first step toward changing the family law canon
and restructuring family law debates, altering the terms on which they take place, transforming
what counts as a convincing argument, and reforming how decisions are made.
To illustrate how the family law canon now operates, the effects it has had, and how it
might be challenged, this Article focuses on three of the family law canon’s most prominent
themes. The first theme, examined in Part I, involves the relationship between family law and
social inequality. As we will see, the family law canon classifies almost every inequality in
family law as part of the past rather than the present. It both overstates the changes that have
occurred in family law over time and understates the distinctions that family law currently draws
between families. This construction of the family law canon has allowed legal authorities
considering and enacting family law policies that might harm historically subordinated groups to
argue that family law no longer supports social inequality and need no longer worry about the
status of historically subordinated people. For instance, the state legislatures and state courts that
have made and defended a wide variety of changes in divorce law in recent years have relied
heavily on the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and social
inequality to contend that family law no longer needs to be concerned about women’s status at
divorce because family law now upholds women’s equality.
Challenging the family law canon’s construction, however, reveals that there are aspects
of modern family law that continue to sustain social inequality, including the social inequality of
women. It makes clear that it is simply not a convincing argument in a family law debate, like
the divorce debate, to contend that family law already supports social equality firmly and
completely. Equality concerns cannot be assumed away like that. Instead, an important issue in
any family law debate is whether the particular family law measure in question is consistent with

5

equality or not.
The second theme, considered in Part II, involves the relationship between family law and
federalism. The family law canon contends that family law is, and has always been, a matter of
exclusively local jurisdiction. This construction of the family law canon suggests that a crucial
and unsettled question in family law is whether the federal government can or should make
family law at all. It has permitted legal authorities and legal scholars to oppose specific instances
of federal family law on the ground that any kind of federal family law is unprecedented and
inappropriate by definition, even where the authorities and scholars concede that the particular
law at issue would otherwise advance worthy goals and purposes.
For instance, judges and judicial organizations never challenged the substantive aims of
the civil rights remedy in the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),8 which
created a federal civil right to be free from gender-motivated violence.9 But judges and judicial
organizations (dubiously) identified VAWA’s civil rights remedy as a form of federal family law,
and then used claims about the inherently local nature of family law to secure significant
limitations on the civil rights remedy before it was enacted by Congress. The argument that
federal family law is unprecedented and categorically inappropriate also played a pivotal part in
the Supreme Court decision that ultimately found even VAWA’s modified civil rights remedy to
be unconstitutional.10 Congressmen and legal scholars have similarly employed the claim that
family law is inherently and exclusively local to oppose the third section of the federal Defense
of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA),11 which defines “‘marriage’” for purposes of all federal
statutory and administrative law as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife.”12 The legislative and scholarly critics of DOMA take this argument from federalism
to be powerful enough to convince even people opposed to same-sex marriage.
Yet contesting the family law canon’s construction reveals the existence and extent of

8

42 U.S.C. § 13 981 (20 00) (found unconstitutional 2000).

9

See id.

10

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 60 1-02, 612-13, 615 -16 (2000).

11

1 U.S.C. § 7 (200 0).

12

Id.

6

federal family law. It makes clear that a federal law cannot be convincingly dismissed simply by
identifying it as a form of family law. Even if VAWA, or DOMA, or other federal statutes are
forms of federal family law, the federal government has long regulated family rights,
responsibilities, and relationships. The relevant question in considering any example of federal
family law is not whether the federal government can or should intervene in family law. It is
whether the specific law at issue is desirable on its own terms, in light of its particular
substantive merits and the possible (state or federal) alternatives. Challenging the exclusion of
federal law from the family law canon helps to establish that one of the leading arguments that
legal authorities and legal scholars now wield against federal family law measures is logically
unconvincing, pushing the opponents of these measures to defend their opposition on new
grounds, if at all.
The third theme, explored in Part III, involves the relationship between family law and
welfare law. The family law canon treats family law and welfare law as wholly separate
categories. When legal authorities identify a statute or situation as part of welfare law, they
assume for that reason that the statute or situation cannot be part of family law at the same time.
The exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon has allowed legal authorities to avoid
explaining why the law applies very different rules to govern familial rights and responsibilities
in poor families. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996,13 for example, structures familial rights and responsibilities in poor families in many ways
that are directly contrary to the law’s regulation of wealthier households. The Personal
Responsibility Act is highly interventionist, while the family law applied to more affluent
families is often reluctant to intervene into decisions about childbearing or the structure of family
living arrangements. Yet the Congress that enacted the Personal Responsibility Act, and the
courts that have upheld the act’s provisions, have never felt the need to acknowledge that the
Personal Responsibility Act applies different rules to govern the familial rights and
responsibilities of the poor, much less to explain why this should be so. Challenging the
construction of the family law canon reveals that many statutes, like the Personal Responsibility
Act, and situations now classified exclusively within welfare law are actually forms of family law
as well. It makes clear that poor families are subject to a different family law and that the

13

42 U.S.C. §§ 6 01-619 (20 00).
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difference must be explained or eliminated.
In sum, contesting the family law canon’s construction is the first step to changing the
family law canon and restructuring the terms on which family law debates take place. It is
important to realize, however, that it is not the only step required. By definition, the family law
canon is hard to alter and resistant to lone reform efforts. After all, the canon consists of ways of
thinking about family law that are widely shared and widely accepted. If this Article convinces
you that much in the family law canon should change, we have to consider what else is needed to
achieve practical reform. The Article concludes by arguing that the next steps that should be
taken to reshape the family law canon need to focus on the process by which legal scholars in one
generation transmit the family law canon to their students and successors. Through our
scholarship and especially our teaching, legal scholars can work to change the family law canon
by shaping the minds and imaginations of the next generation to think about family law in
different ways. We can use our academic writing, our courses, and our casebooks to subject the
family law canon to scrutiny, question, and challenge. We can discuss and draw attention to the
persistence of inequality in family law, and to the family law canon’s role in disguising,
protecting, and perpetuating that inequality. We can examine the federal law and welfare law
now excluded from the family law canon, and explore the consequences of those exclusions. The
process of reforming the family law canon by intervening in its intergenerational transmission
will not be easy or immediate. But as we will see, the effort is well justified because much is at
stake.
Let’s turn to the family law canon.

I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

The family law canon almost always identifies any inequalities in family law as rooted in
past rather than present practices. It overstates the changes that have occurred in family law over
time and understates the distinctions that family law currently draws between families. This
construction of the family law canon has permitted legal authorities debating and instituting
family law policies that might injure historically subordinated groups to deny that there are
existing and continuing inequalities in family law, and to argue that family law no longer needs
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to be concerned about the status and position of historically subordinated people. Yet there is
substantial evidence, now excluded from the family law canon, that establishes the persistence of
many forms of inequality within family law. Challenging the family law canon’s construction
reveals that it is not a convincing argument in a family law debate to insist that family law
already supports social equality thoroughly and completely. Social equality is an important goal
for family law, but declaring its accomplishment is significantly premature. Instead, a crucial
question in any family law discussion has to be whether the specific policy at issue is consistent
with equality concerns or not.
This part examines the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law
and social inequality, and explores its systematic inaccuracies. It then turns to the recent debate
over divorce law, in which state legislatures and state courts enacting and defending a number of
changes in divorce law have relied on the canonical understanding of the relationship between
family law and social inequality to contend that family law no longer needs to worry about
women’s status upon divorce because family law no longer supports women’s inequality. This
divorce debate illustrates some of the consequences of the family law canon’s construction. It
also indicates how challenging the family law canon’s construction can be the first step to
changing the canon and restructuring family law debates, altering what counts as a good reason
and reforming how decisions are made.

A.

Overstating Change over Time

Let’s begin by considering how the family law canon overstates the changes that have
occurred in family law over time. One of the best places to observe this aspect of the family law
canon is within three of the canonical stories that legal authorities and legal scholars repeatedly
use to explain and describe family law and its governing principles. These stories are that family
law has moved from status to contract, that common law coverture principles no longer shape the
law of marriage, and that common law property norms no longer shape the law of parenthood.
Each of these canonical stories presents a limited and even deceptive picture of family law and its
animating principles, overstating the changes that have occurred in family law over time and
denying and concealing the persistence of inequality in family law. Consider the three canonical
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stories in turn.

1.

Status and Contract

The first, and perhaps most prominent, canonical story that legal authorities and
especially legal scholars tell about family law is that family law has moved from status to
contract. This story contends that family law was once governed by status rules that were set by
the state and unalterable by the individuals involved, but is now a matter of contract, so that
individuals can structure their family relationships as they see fit. The story celebrates the rise of
contractualization as a triumph of individual freedom and equality.
The status-to-contract story originated at least as early as the nineteenth century, with
Henry Sumner Maine’s famous declaration in an 1861 treatise “that the movement of the
progressive societies” in family law “has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”14
Modern scholarly reiteration and endorsement of the status-to-contract story abounds. Legal
scholars repeatedly explain that “Maine was more right than he knew and probably more right
than he wanted to be,”15 that “[t]he legal system increasingly views family members as business
associates and contract partners,”16 that “[m]odern family law has steadily moved toward contract
as its governing principle,”17 that “[a]n accelerated movement from status to contract is
discernible in the realm of family relations,”18 that in “the law of marriage, scholars have come to
understand our legal rules as resting mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible to alteration
by actual bargains,”19 that “[n]owhere has modern law’s shift from status to contract been more

14

R E LA T IO N
15

H E N R Y S UMNER M A IN E , A NCIENT L AW : I TS C ONNECTION WITH THE E A R LY H ISTORY O F S OCIETY , A N D I TS
M O D E R N I DEAS 170 (Lond on, John M urray 1861).

TO

M A R Y A N N G L EN D O N , T HE N E W F A M IL Y A N D T HE N E W P ROPERTY 43 (1981 ).

16

Janet L. Do lgin, The Family in Transition: From Grisw old to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 G EO . L.J. 1519,
1534 (1 994).
17

M IL TO N C. R EGAN , J R ., F A M IL Y L AW AND

18

W alter O tto W eyrauc h, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM . L.Q. 415, 417 (1980).

THE

P URS UIT OF I NTIMACY 35 (1993 ).

19

John H. Langb ein, The Contrac tarian Basis of the Law of Tru sts, 105 Y ALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
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apparent than in family law.”20
In fact, the status-to-contract story is so much a part of the family law canon, and its
outlines are so well-worn into the fabric of the family law literature, that scholars tend to use the
same examples to illustrate the status-to-contract story. Scholars explaining family law’s past
emersion in status rules, for instance, frequently employ as their quintessential illustration the
Supreme Court’s statement in Maynard v. Hill (1888)21 that when people marry “a relation
between the parties is created which they cannot change.”22 Scholars describing the current
contractualization of family law, in turn, most often cite the availability of no-fault divorce,23 the

20

W ILLIAM N. E SKRIDGE , J R ., G AYLAW : C HALLENGING THE A PARTHEID OF THE C LOSET 271 (1999); see also
Stephen J. Morse, Family L aw in Tra nsition : Fro m Traditional Fam ilies to Ind ividual Liberty, in C HANGING I MAGES
OF THE F AM ILY 319, 339 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) (“[T]he law does not ban spouses from
creating almost any kind of relationship that satisfies them.”).
21

125 U .S. 190 (1888 ).

22

Id. at 211. Note that Ma ynard ’s 1888 statement came twenty-seven years after Maine had already
declared family law’s movement from status to contract. For scholarly use of the Ma ynard example in telling the
status-to-contract story, see R EGAN , supra note 1 7, at 10 (“Nineteenth-century judges and scholars were exp licit in
emphasizing that marriage was a status rather than simply a contract. As the Supreme Court stated in Maynard v.
Hill . . . .”); Jana B . Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 W IS . L. R EV . 1443, 1456 (“Although marriage
has often been described as a civil contract, until recently it was the state, and not the parties, that set the terms of
this contract. Parties co uld choose whether to enter into marriage, but they could no t define the terms of their un ion.
As the Supreme Court explained in Ma yna rd v. H ill . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Cynthia Starne s, Divorce and the
Disp laced Ho mema ker: A Discourse on Play ing w ith Dolls, Pa rtnersh ip Bu you ts and Disso ciation Un der N o-F ault,
60 U. C H I. L. R EV . 67, 106-07 (1993) (“Early efforts to identify the nature of the marriage relationship focused on
whether marriage is a contra ct or a sta tus. At the heart of this dispute lay the very prac tical que stion of who should
fix the terms of the relationship—the parties, the church, or the state. The state ultimately won. As the U.S.
Supreme Co urt observed in 1888 . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
23

See J ANET L. D O LG IN , D EFINING THE F AM ILY : L AW , T ECHNOLOGY , A N D R E P RO D U C TIO N IN A N U NEASY
A GE 35-36 (1997) (“In the late 1960s state legislators began to permit divorce upon agreement of the parties: nofault divorce. . . . [W]ithin a decade the law transferred a great part of the responsibility for regulating marriage and
divorce from the state to the p arties invo lved. . . . As with business partners, spouses can design the terms of their
relationships’ beginnings and endings, and the law will enforce the agre ements they rea ch.”); R EGAN , supra note 17,
at 38 (“All states now provide for some form of no-fault divorce, with all but two authorizing divorce on the motion
of only one party. In contrast to the Victorian notion of marriage as a relationship involving the performance of
certain socially important duties, a no-fault regime reflects a conception of marriage as a private matter, controlled
by the p references o f the parties.”) (foo tnotes o mitted); Singer, supra note 22, at 1445 (“The no-fault divorce
revolution is perhaps the most obvious example of this privatization process. Under the fault-based divorce system,
the state d etermined when an d whe ther a couple could divo rce. . . . Under the current no -fault system, b y contra st,
the spouses themselves—and often one spouse acting unilaterally—can choose whether and when to terminate a
marriage. . . . The no-fault divorce revolution is highly significant in and of itself. It is also emblematic of a much
larger revolution in family law—the transformation from public to private ordering of behavior.”) (footnote omitted).
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enforceability of prenuptial agreements about property distribution,24 and the enforceability of
agreements between nonmarital partners.25
The status-to-contract story has some foundation. As it notes, there are areas of family
law that are more contractualized than they once were. But the status-to-contract story overstates
the changes that have occurred in family law over time. It obscures the substantial evidence that
supports a counter-narrative that could be told about family law, but is not: the story of the
persistence of status rules denying individuals choice about the structure of their relationships.
Status rules are probably most apparent in the law of parenthood.26 However, the
illustrations used to support the status-to-contract story focus on the law of marriage, so I will
focus there as well in demonstrating the persistence of status. Marriage law alone provides
ample evidence.
The persistence of status is evident, for example, in the continued limits that family law
24

See D O LG IN , supra note 23, at 36 (“A further example of the process of defining and treating the family as
a collection o f separate individuals rather than as a unit of social value beyo nd the individuals invo lved, appe ars in
antenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce. Dismissed by courts everywhere only a few decades ago as
violative of state public p olicy, such agreements are now widely rec ognized an d enfo rced.”); R EGAN , supra note 17,
at 37 (“Rec eptivity to private ordering o f the terms of family life is underscore d by greater willingness of courts to
enforce marital contracts. Courts traditionally were reluctant to enforce most antenuptial agreements between
spouses for fear that they might alter the ‘essential incidents’ of marriage or that provision for property division or
support upon divorce might encourage marital dissolution. With the decline of consensus about the terms of
marriage, and with the prevalence of divorce, most states have adopted the view that it is unreasonable to regard
marital contracts as co ntrary to public policy.”) (foo tnotes o mitted); Singer, supra note 22, at 1460 (“Even where
state-imposed marital obligations remain as the background legal regime, spouses today have considerable freedom
to alter those background ob ligations by private contract, either before or during marriage. For example, the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which has been adopted by sixteen states since its promulgation in 1983,
authorizes prospective spouses to contract with each other with respect to their property rights and support
obligations, as well as ‘any other m atter, including the ir perso nal rights and obligations, not in violation of pub lic
policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.’”) (footnote omitted).
25

See D O LG IN , supra note 23, at 36 (“Legal acknowledgement that the spousal relationship is no longer
uniquely defined by an encomp assing and fixed set of rights and obligations is further indicated by the increasing
willingness of courts and legislatures to recognize coh abitation agreements between p arties never formally
married.”); R EGAN , supra note 1 7, at 40 (“Greater willingness to enforc e con tracts between unmarried coha bitants
reflects the mutually reinforcing character of increased deference to private ordering and the declining significance
of status.”); Singer, supra note 22, at 1449-51 (“Another way the law traditionally privileged marriage over
nonmarital intimate relationships was by denying unmarried cohabitants access to the judicial system for resolving
financial disputes arising out of their relationship. . . . Over the past fifteen years, this traditional rule has eroded
significantly. . . . [C]ourts in many states [have] applied both express and implied contract remedies to resolve
disputes about property and financial arrangements arising out of cohabitation relationships. . . . Consistent with the
modern emphasis on private ordering, however, most courts have been unwilling to grant nonagreement-based
supp ort rights to unma rried cohabitants o r to extend statutory divorce obliga tions, such as the p ayment of attorneys
fees.”).
26

See infra Part I.A.3.
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places on marriage formation. All states prohibit polygamous marriages,27 prohibit marriages
between some relatives,28 and prohibit marriages before a certain age.29 All states but one
prohibit same-sex marriages.30 These laws are status rules set by the government and unalterable
by the individuals involved. They limit a person’s ability to choose whom he will marry and
when he will marry.
The persistence of status rules is also evident in continued and important limitations on
the organization of ongoing marital relationships. Consider, for instance, marital rape
exemptions, which persist in some form in a majority of states. These exemptions treat rape
more leniently if it occurs in marriage: They recognize a smaller range of conduct as criminal,
place less severe sanctions on the marital rape they do criminalize, and/or impose additional

27

See, e.g., A RIZ . C ONST . art. 20, para. 2 (“Polygamous or plural marriages, or polygamous cohabitation,
are forever prohibited within this State.”); I D A H O C ONST . art. I, § 4 (“Bigamy and polygam y are forever p rohib ited in
th e sta te , a nd th e legislatu re sh all p ro vid e b y la w for the punishme nt of such c rimes.” ); N .M . C ONST . art. XXI, § 1
(“Po lygamo us or p lural ma rriages and p olygam ous cohabitation are forever p rohib ited.”); O KLA . C ONST . art. 1, § 2
(“Po lygamo us or p lural ma rriages are forever p rohib ited.”); U T A H C ONST . art. III, § 1 (“[P]olygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited.”).
28

See, e.g., C OLO . R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 18 -6-30 1(1) (W est 1999) (“Any p erson who knowingly marries . . .
an ancestor or descendant, . . . a brother or sister of the whole or half blood, or an uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of
the who le blood comm its incest, which is a class 4 felony.”); F LA . S TAT . A N N . § 826.04 (West 2000) (“Whoever
know ingly marries . . . a person to whom he or she is related by lineal co nsanguinity, or a b rother, sister, uncle, aunt,
nephew, or niece, commits incest, which constitutes a felony of the third degree . . . .”); N.Y. P EN AL L AW § 255.25
(McKinney 2000) (“A person is guilty of incest when he or she marries . . . a person whom he or she knows to be
related to him or her, either legitimately or out of wedlock, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the
whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.”); 18 P A . C O N S . S TAT . A N N . § 430 2 (W est Supp. 2003 ) (“A
person is guilty of incest, a felony of the second degree, if that person knowingly marries . . . an ancestor or
descendant, a brother or sister of the whole or half blood or an uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole blood. The
relationships referred to in this section include blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, and relationship of
parent and child by adoption.”).
29

See, e.g., D EL. C ODE A N N . tit. 13, § 123(a) (1999) (“No male under the age of 18 nor any female under
the age of 16 shall marry.”); N.D. C E N T. C O D E § 14-03-02 (19 97) (“A marriage license may not be issued to any
perso n belo w the age of sixtee n, notwithstanding the consent of the p arents o r guard ian of said person.”); O R . R EV .
S TAT . § 106.010 (2 001) (“M arriage is a civil contract entered into in person by males at least 17 years of age and
females at least 17 years of age, who are otherwise capable, and solemnized in accordance with ORS 10 6.150.”);
S.C. C ODE A N N . § 20-1-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (“A marriage license must not be issued when either
app licant is und er the age of sixteen.”); see also Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(upholding constitutionality of New York law requiring “that all male applicants for a marriage license between ages
16 and 18 and all female applicants between ages 14 and 18 must obtain the co nsent of their parents, and that a
female between ages 14 and 16 must obtain judicial approval as well as parental consent”).
30

See infra notes 1 29-1 30 and ac com panying text.
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procedural hurdles on marital rape prosecutions.31 All of these marital rape exemptions are status
rules. They are set by the state, and the parties to a marriage cannot come to a legally enforceable
agreement to alter them.
Interspousal tort immunities, which persist in some form in at least eight states, are also
status rules governing the marital relation. These immunities exempt a tortfeaser from liability in
some circumstances because he has inflicted the tort on his spouse. Some states, for instance,
limit the torts that can be the basis of an interspousal tort suit.32 Some states prohibit interspousal
tort suits unless the marital relationship is functionally or legally over.33 All of these interspousal
tort immunities are established by the state and unwaivable by the parties involved.
Similarly, at least thirty-three states recognize some form of the doctrine of necessaries.
Under this doctrine, spouses are prohibited from suing each other directly for support, but are
obligated to pay each other’s debts, if the debts are for necessary expenses.34 The doctrine
31

See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. R EV . 1373,
1375 & nn.1-3 (2000).
32

They pro vide that spouses ca n sue each o ther on ly for negligent torts, see Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d
109 6, 11 00-0 1 (D el. 1993), or only for intentional torts, see Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 , 590, 592 (U tah 1980),
or only for torts arising from a motor vehicle accident, see Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 , 1017 (Ne v. 1974);
Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (Vt. 1973), or only for torts that do not implicate “marital or nuptial
privileges, consensual acts and simple, common domestic negligence,” Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189, 1192 (N.J.
197 9), or only for torts that do not involve “‘perso nal injuries betw een m arried perso ns [that] will not justify a
recovery of damages,’” Bro wn v. B rown, 409 N.E .2d 7 17, 7 19 (Mass. 19 80) (citation omitted ); see also Nogueira v.
Nogueira, 444 N .E.2d 940, 94 0-41 (M ass. 1983).
33

They provide, for example, that spouses can sue each other in tort only if they were separated at the time
the tort o ccurred, see Harris v. Harris, 31 3 S.E .2d 8 8, 89 -90 (G a. 1984); see also G A . C ODE A N N . § 19-3-8 (1999),
or only if they have divorced by the time the suit is filed, see Duplechin v. Toce, 497 So. 2d 763, 765 (La. Ct. App.
198 6); see also L A . R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 9:291 (W est 2000).
34

See, e.g., C AL. F AM . C O D E § 914(a) (W est Supp. 2003) (“[A] married person is personally liable for the
following debts incurred by the person’s spouse during marriage: (1) A debt incurred for necessaries of life of the
person’s spouse while the spouses are living together. (2) Except as provided in Section 4302, a debt incurred for
common necessaries of life of the person’s spouse while the spouses are living separately.”); N.Y. J U D . C T . A CTS
L AW § 41 2 (M cKinney 1999 ) (“A m arried perso n is chargeab le with the suppo rt of his or her spouse and, if
possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be required to pay for his or her support a fair and
reasonable sum, as the court may determine, having due regard to the circumstances of the respective parties.”);
O H IO R EV . C ODE A N N . § 31 03.0 3(C) (W est Sup p. 20 03) (“If a married p erson neglects to support the person’s
spouse in accordance with this section, any other person, in good faith, may supply the spouse with necessaries for
the support of the spouse and recover the reasonable value of the necessaries supplied from the married person who
neglected to support the spouse unless the spouse abandons that person without cause.”); 23 P A . C O N S . S TAT . A N N . §
4102 (W est 2001) (“In all cases where debts are contracted for necessaries by either spouse for the support and
maintenance of the family, it shall be lawful for the cred itor in this case to institute suit against the husb and and w ife
for the price of such necessaries and, after obtaining a judgment, have an execution against the spouse contracting
the debt alone; and, if no property of that spouse is found, execution may be levied upon and satisfied out of the
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determines significant rights and responsibilities associated with marriage and denies marital
partners the right to change them. The states enforcing the doctrine of necessaries decide which
debts count as necessaries,35 they set how much liability each spouse will bear for the other
spouse’s debts,36 and they impose liability for a spouse’s debts even if the marital partners never
agreed to share debts, never informed third parties that they would assume each other’s debts,

separate property of the other spouse.”); S.D. C O D IF IE D L A W S § 25-7-2 (M ichie 1999) (“If a person neglects to make
adequate pro vision for the sup port of his or her spo use, any other p erson may in good faith supp ly the spo use with
reaso nable nece ssaries for the spouse’s support and recover the reasonable value thereo f from tha t perso n, exce pt in
cases where by law the perso n is not liab le for the spou se’s support.”); T EX . F AM . C ODE A N N . § 2.501(b) (Vernon
1998) (“A spo use who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to any person who provides necessaries to the
spouse to w hom supp ort is owed.”); V A . C ODE A N N . § 55 -37 (M ichie 1995 ) (“The do ctrine of necessaries as it
existed at common law shall apply equally to both spouses, except where they are permanently living separate and
apart, but shall in no event create any liability between such spouses as to each other.”); Landmark M ed. Ctr. v.
Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1152 (R.I. 1994) (“[T]he common-law necessaries doctrine should be expanded in Rhode
Island to impose a mutual burden on both spouses . . . .”); Richland Mem’l Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12, 13 (S.C.
198 4) (“W e . . . hold that the necessaries do ctrine allows third parties providing necessaries to a husb and or wife to
bring an action against the individual’s spouse.”); Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tenn. 1983)
(holding that suit for necessaries cannot be dismissed because husband rather than wife incurred debts).
35

See, e.g., C OLO . R EV . S TAT . § 14-6-110 (200 2) (“The expenses of the family and the education of the
children are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they
may b e sued jointly or separately.”); C O N N . G EN . S TAT . A N N . § 46b-37(b) (W est Supp. 2003) (“[I]t shall be the joint
duty of each spouse to support his or her family, and both shall be liable for: (1) The reasonable and necessary
service s of a physician o r dentist; (2) hospital expenses rendered the husband or wife or minor child while residing in
the family of his or her parents; (3) the rental of any dwelling unit actually occupied by the husband and wife as a
residence and reasonably necessary to them for that purpose; and (4) any article purchased by either which has in fact
gone to the support of the family, or for the joint benefit of both.”); N.D. C E N T. C O D E § 14-07-08(3) (19 97) (“The
husband and wife are liable jointly and severally for any debts contracted by either, while living together, for
necessary household supplies of food, clothing, and fuel, and for shelter for themselves and family, and for the
education of their minor ch ildren.”); W ASH . R EV . C ODE A N N . § 26 .16.2 05 (W est 1997) (“Th e exp enses o f the family
and the education of the children, including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife,
or either of them, and they may be sued jointly or separately. W hen a petition for dissolution of marriage or a
petition for legal separation is filed, the court may, upon motion of the stepparent, terminate the obligation to support
the stepchildren. The obligation to support stepchildren shall cease upon the entry of a decree of dissolution, decree
of legal separation, or death.”).
36

They estab lish, for instance, joint and severa l liability, see, e.g., 750 ILL. C O M P . S TAT . 65/15(a)(1) (2000);
I OWA C ODE A N N . § 59 7.14 (W est 2001); M ASS . A N N . L A W S ch. 20 9, § 1 (Law. Co-o p. 19 94); M O N T . C ODE A N N . §
40-2 -106 (2001); O KLA . S TAT . A N N . tit. 43, § 2 09.1 (W est 2001); O R . R EV . S TAT . § 10 8.04 0(1) (2001); W Y O . S TAT .
A N N . § 20 -1-20 1 (M ichie 2003 ), secondary liability, see, e.g., H AW . R EV . S TAT . § 510-8(h) (1993); B artrom v.
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. 1993); Hawley v. Hawley, 904 S.W.2d 584, 585-86 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1345 (N.H. 1995), or sex-linked liability with husbands
more liable for their wives’ debts than the reve rse, see K Y . R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 40 4.04 0 (M ichie 1999 ); N EB . R EV .
S TAT . § 42 -201 (1993); N EV . R EV . S TAT . 123.090, 123.110 (2001); Swogger v. Sunrise Hosp., Inc., 496 P.2d 751,
752 (N ev. 1972) (per curiam); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W .2d 326, 327 -28 (W is. 1982).
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and explicitly declared that they would not be responsible for each other’s debts.37
Family law’s consistent refusal to enforce interspousal contracts for domestic services
establishes yet another status rule. No state authorizes spouses to enter into legally enforceable
agreements providing that one spouse will compensate the other for domestic services performed.
When spouses have negotiated such agreements and attempted to enforce them in court,
moreover, state courts have uniformly declined to recognize these agreements, even when they
are explicit and specific.38 State courts invaliding interspousal contracts for domestic services
37

See, e.g., Davis v. Baxter County Reg’l Hosp., 855 S.W .2d 303, 304 -06 (Ark. 1993) (enforcing doctrine
of necessaries where husba nd “ha d never agreed to be respo nsible fo r [wife’s] medica l bills”); St. Francis R eg’l
Med. C tr., Inc. v. B owles, 836 P.2d 11 23, 1 125 , 112 8 (K an. 19 92) (“Th e sole issue on appeal is whe ther T amara is
liable for Edward’s medical expenses as a matter of law even though she did not contract with St. Francis for her
husband’s care. . . . [W]e hereby expand the common-law doctrine to apply to husbands and wives equally.”); Jersey
Shore M ed. C tr.-Fitkin H osp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 100 3, 10 10 (N.J. 198 0) (“N ormally a person is not liable
for the debt of another in the absence of an agreement. The imposition of liability based on marital status alone is an
exception to that rule. Nonetheless, it is a justifiable exception.”); N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d
471 , 474 (N.C . 198 7) (“O ur decision is a recognition o f a personal duty of each sp ouse to support the other, a duty
arising fro m the m arital relationship itself and carrying with it the corollary right to supp ort from the othe r spouse.
Because this obligation, like the husband’s obligation to pay for the medical expenses of his wife, arises from the
marriage relationship, attempts by the wife, as here, to disavow this duty have no effect.”).
38

See Bo relli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. R ptr. 2d 16, 2 0 (Ct. App . 199 3) (“W e . . . adhere to the longstanding rule
that a spouse is not entitled to compensation for support, apart from rights to community property and the like that
arise from the marital relation itself. Personal performance of a personal duty created by the contract of marriage
does not constitute a new consideration supporting the indebtedness alleged in this case.”); Dep’t of Human R es. v.
W illiams, 20 2 S.E .2d 5 04, 5 06 (Ga. Ct. Ap p. 19 73) (“Th e law is that a husband is entitled to receive the dome stic
services of his wife.”) (emphasis omitted); Mays v. Wadel, 236 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind. App. 1968) (“It is the law of
this State that between husband and wife, while they are living together as such in a commo n household, that there
can b e no express or implied contra ct for co mpe nsation or pa yment for any services o r acts perform ed or rendered in
and about the home by either of them in the common support of that household.”); State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d
886, 888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“The fact that Bachmann’s husband has offered to pay an hourly wage to her does
not change our conclusion [that an interspousal contract for domestic services is not a recognizable employment
contract]. . . . Bachm ann ha s an ob ligation to care fo r her children regard less of whether she is paid to do so.”); In re
Estate of Lord, 602 P.2d 1 030, 103 1 (N.M . 1979) (“In Tellez v. Tellez this Court held that a contract whereby one
spouse agrees to pay the o ther spouse for his or her care, which is pa rt of the other’s duties as a spouse, is against
pub lic policy and is therefore void. . . . W e believe that Tellez states a proper principle, and we hereby reaffirm the
public policy basis for that decision.”) (citation omitted); Church v. Church, 630 P.2d 1243, 1250 (N.M. Ct. App.
198 1) (“Under V irginia law a wife has a duty to provide house hold services to her husband and the husband has a
duty to support his wife. . . . Having a duty to provide the services of a wife, those services are not a basis for relief
for fraud, or breach of contract, or for an equitable award based on unjust enrichment.”); Kuder v. Schroeder, 430
S.E.2d 2 71, 2 73 (N.C . Ct. Ap p. 19 93) (“Under the law of this S tate, there is a personal duty of each sp ouse to
support the other, a duty arising from the marital relationship, and carrying with it the corollary right to support from
the other spouse. So long as the coverture endures, this duty of support may not be abrogated or modified by the
agree ment of the parties to a marria ge.”) (c itation omitted); Matthews v. M atthews, 162 S.E.2 d 69 7, 69 8 (N .C. Ct.
App. 196 8) (“It is well settled that a contract between husband and wife whereby one spouse agrees to perform
specified obligations imposed by law as a part of the marital duties of the spouses to each other is without
consideration, and is void a s against public policy. Und er the law , a husband has the right to the services o f his wife
as a wife, and this includes his right to her society and her performance of her household and domestic duties.”)
(citations omitted); Dade v. Anderson, 439 S.E .2d 353, 354 (Va. 1994 ) (“In Alexand er v. Kuykend all this Court held
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have also authoritatively determined what counts as domestic services, regardless of the parties’
understandings. Courts have applied the prohibition on interspousal contracts for domestic
services, for instance, to unusually demanding and time-consuming work, such as the full-time
care of an invalid spouse.39 Like marital rape exemptions, interspousal tort immunities, and
doctrines of necessaries, this body of law establishes important benefits and burdens associated
with marriage and gives the parties involved no right to change them.
In sum, the status-to-contract story, now firmly entrenched in the family law canon, offers
an incomplete and even misleading description of family law and its governing principles. It
overstates the changes that have occurred in family law over time, concealing and excluding the
evidence of the persistence of status rules.

2.

Coverture

A second, and related, story in the family law canon is that principles of common law
coverture no longer shape and govern the law of marriage. This story asserts that the common
law regime that denied married women most aspects of a separate legal identity by placing wives
under their husbands’ legal control, or cover,40 has been vanquished and excised from the law of
marriage. Even more than the status-to-contract story, the story of coverture’s demise is a
narrative of progress. It describes the replacement of a legal order that subordinated married

that one spouse may not recover in implied contract for services rendered to the other. We are asked in the present
case to overrule Alexander and allow the plaintiff, June A. Dade, to recover from the estate of her deceased husband,
Thom as Gwendo l Dade, for services she rendered to him during a period of illness. We decline the request and
affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.”) (citation and footnote omitted).
39

See Borelli, 16 C al. Rptr. 2d at 17-18; Mays, 236 N.E .2d at 182 -83; In re Estate of Lord, 602 P.2d at
103 2; Dade, 439 S.E.2d at 354.
40

William Blackstone offered the classic and most influential definition of coverture:

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every
thing . . . . Upon this principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the
legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.
1 W ILLIAM B L AC K ST O N E, C OMM ENTARIES *430 ; see also E L IZ AB E TH B OWLES W ARBASSE , T HE C HANGING L EGAL
R IGHTS OF M A R R IE D W OMEN , 180 0-18 61, at 5-9, 13-14 , 22-2 4 (1987 ); Hasday, supra note 31, at 1389-92.
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women with one that recognizes and respects married women’s legal equality.
Proclamations of coverture’s demise are ubiquitous in the family law jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court, for instance, has declared that:
Nowhere in the common-law world—indeed in any modern society—is a woman
regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the
dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being. Chip by chip, over
the years those archaic notions have been cast aside so that “[n]o longer is the
female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”41
Many lower courts, joined by family law scholars and family law casebooks,42 have similarly
announced the end of coverture, explaining that “[t]he old common law doctrine that a husband
and wife are to be regarded as one entity has long since been discarded in modern
jurisprudence,”43 that “[t]he old fiction of the unity of person of the husband and wife has been
completely abrogated,”44 that “the notions that a woman should be regarded as her husband’s
chattel and deprived of her dignity and recognition as a whole human being through the denial of
41

Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15
(1975)); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 (1992) (noting “our rejection of the common-law
understanding of a woman’s role within the family”); Orr v. Orr, 440 U .S. 268, 279-80 (19 79) (“Stanton v. Stanton
held that the ‘old notio[n]’ that ‘generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provid e a home and its esse ntials,’
can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. ‘No longer is the female destined solely for
the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.’”) (citations
omitted); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (197 5) (“Notwithstanding the ‘old notions’ to which the Utah court
referred, we perceive nothing rational in the distinction . . . . No longer is the female destined solely for the home and
the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”).
42

See, e.g., E V A N G E R ST M A N N , S A M E-S EX M ARRIAGE AND THE C O N S TIT U TIO N 23 (2 004 ) (“[T ]he W est . . .
has traditionally granted men and women such different, and uneq ual, legal rights within marriage. These
differences have been entirely eliminated in almost all the Western world . . . . [T]he sexist laws that required a
wom an to o ccup y the legally inferior ro le have been eliminated . . . .”); C AR L E. S CHNEIDER & M ARGARET F. B RIN IG ,
A N I N V IT A TIO N T O F A M IL Y L AW : P RINCIPLES, P ROCESS , A N D P ERSPECTIVES 168 (2d ed. 2000) (“The old principles
[that governed family law], based in im portant ways o n different roles fo r men and w ome n, were rejected.”); L Y N N
D. W ARDLE & L AURENCE C. N OLAN , F UN DA M EN TAL P RINCIPLES OF F A M IL Y L AW 464 (2002) (“Marriage [at common
law] wa s not a p artnership as it is tod ay, rather it was a guardianship, p rofitable to the husband.”); Morse, supra note
20, at 321 (“W herea s the law fo rmerly proc laimed that husb and and w ife were one and the husba nd wa s ‘the one,’
this view is now considered outrageous, an affront to the dignity and autonomy of women.”). For a contrary account
suggesting that co verture rules and principles may p ersist, see Joan W illiams, Is Coverture Dead?: Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony, 82 G EO . L.J. 2227, 2236 (1994) (“In a sense, then, coverture has been updated rather than
abolished. At common law, coverture cut wives off from ownership by formally denying them the right to own
property. Although today ownership is formally open to all, in practice most wives are cut off from property rights
in the key family asset— the wage of the ideal worker.”) (footnote omitted).
43

In re Luby, 89 B.R. 120 , 125-26 (Bankr. D . Or. 1988).

44

Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 12 10 (M iss. 1988).
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a separate legal identity have been thoroughly rejected.”45
Indeed, courts have been recounting the story of coverture’s demise since long before the
advent of modern sex discrimination jurisprudence made coverture constitutionally vulnerable by
applying equal protection principles to the legal treatment of women. The Supreme Court, for
example, did not strike down any statute on the ground that it denied women the equal protection
of the laws until 1971.46 But as early as 1960, the Court announced that “a wife’s legal
submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out, not only in the English-speaking world
generally but emphatically so in this country.”47 In 1961, the Court reported “the enlightened
emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years” in the process of
upholding a statute that limited women’s jury service.48
The story of coverture’s demise can be such an old story in the family law canon because
the courts recounting the story, whether in the middle of the twentieth century or more recently,
have relied on evidence from the nineteenth century to prove their case, to the extent that they
have cited any specific evidence at all. The married women’s property acts, which many states
enacted starting in the 1830s, gave married women the rights to sue and be sued, make contracts,
own separate property, and keep their wages.49 Courts repeating the story of the end of coverture
take the enactment of these statutes as their central piece of proof. They explain that the married

45
Peo ple v. M .D., 595 N .E.2d 70 2, 71 0 (Ill. Ap p. Ct. 1 992 ); see also Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481, 484
(N.J. 1970) (“Although the original basis for the common law immunity doctrine was the theory of legal identity of
husband and w ife, this metaphysical concept canno t be seriously defended today.”); Rob inson v. Tro usdale Co unty,
516 S.W .2d 626, 631 (Tenn. 1974 ) (“We do not believe that the common law disability of coverture has any
sanction in our jurisprudence or any relevance in our society.”).
46

See Reed v. Reed, 40 4 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).

47

United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54 (19 60).

48

Ho yt v. Florid a, 368 U .S. 57 , 61-6 2 (1961 ); cf. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1873)
(Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) (upholding women’s exclusion from the bar while noting “[t]he humane
mov ements of mo dern society, which have for their ob ject the multiplication o f avenues for woma n’s advancement,
and of occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have my heartiest concurrence”).
49

See N ORMA B ASCH , I N THE E YES OF THE L AW : W OMEN , M ARRIAGE , A N D P R O P ER T Y IN N INETEENTH C E N TU R Y N E W Y ORK 158 -59, 164 (198 2); J AMES S CHOULER , A T REATISE ON THE L AW OF THE D OMESTIC R E LA T IO N S
16 (Bo ston, Little, B rown, & Co. 18 70); Richard H . Chused, Late Nine teenth Cen tury M arried Women’s P roperty
Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM . J. L EGA L H IST . 3,
3 (1985 ); Richard H . Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 G EO . L.J. 1359, 1398, 1410-11
(1983); Reva B. Siegel, Home a s Work: T he First Woman’s R ights Claim s Con cerning Wives’ H ouseh old La bor,
1850-1880, 103 Y ALE L.J. 1073, 1082 -83, 1142-43, 118 0-81 (1994 ).
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women’s property acts were “[t]he beginning of the end of coverture,”50 that “the common law
unity concept . . . . was largely dissipated by the widespread enactment of ‘Married Women’s
Acts’ in the mid-nineteenth century,”51 that the married women’s property acts “fully and
effectively eradicated the common law disability of coverture.”52
The married women’s property acts were in some respects an important strike against
coverture, and the coverture regime that controlled the law of marriage at the beginning of the
1830s has certainly not survived perfectly intact to the present day. But the canonical story of
coverture’s demise overstates the changes that have occurred in family law over time. There is
substantial evidence within family law to support a counter-narrative that the end of coverture
story excludes from the family law canon and denies: the story of the persistence of coverture
principles and rules.
Consider again, for instance, the marital rape exemption, interspousal tort immunity, the
prohibition on interspousal contracts for domestic services, and the doctrine of necessaries. All
of these status rules originated as part of common law coverture, and each continues to preserve
substantial elements of the coverture regime.
Let’s begin with the marital rape exemption. At common law, a husband was completely
exempt from prosecution for raping his wife.53 Courts and treatise writers defended the
exemption with the same reasoning they employed to defend all of marital status law and
common law coverture. A wife, they explained, gave her irretractable consent to marital sex
when she agreed to marry, just as her agreement to marry constituted her irrevocable consent to
the rest of marital status law and to the other legal disabilities associated with common law
coverture.54 Starting in the last quarter of the twentieth century, states made two changes to this
common law regime. First, a majority of states modified the scope of their marital rape
exemptions so that the exemptions were no longer absolute, and a minority of states eliminated

50

Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 4 n.2 (Ind. 1993).

51

Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 48 1, 482 (N.J. 197 0).

52

Robinson v. Trousda le County, 516 S.W .2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1974 ).

53

See Hasday, supra note 31, at 1392-93.

54

See id. at 1396-1400.

20

their exemptions.55 Second, almost every marital rape exemption was rewritten in sex-neutral
terms, so that it shielded “spouses” rather than husbands from marital rape prosecution.56 The
first change was important. It is now at least formally possible to prosecute some marital rapes,
something that was impossible in any state before the 1970s. But the modern law of marital rape
preserves substantial elements of the common law order. Modern marital rape exemptions may
speak in a sex-neutral idiom, for example, but that has essentially no effect on how the
exemptions operate in fact. All the available evidence indicates that husbands commit virtually
every act of marital rape. Indeed, law enforcement authorities have found only a handful of cases
that may have involved a woman raping any adult man.57 In virtually all instances, men are the
“spouses” who continue to receive legal protection when they commit marital rape, and women
are the “spouses” who are legally unprotected when they are the victims of marital rape. As a
matter of practice, marital rape exemptions continue to define a man’s rights in marriage to
include sexual control over his wife.
Let’s turn to interspousal tort immunity. Courts created doctrines of interspousal tort
immunity in the middle of the nineteenth century. Before then, there was no possibility of
interspousal litigation, because married women were prohibited from filing any kind of suit. The
married women’s property acts, however, granted wives the right to sue in their own names.58
The acts did not specifically give married women the right to sue their husbands,59 but they raised
the specter of interspousal litigation for the first time. Courts promptly responded by establishing
a common law rule of interspousal tort immunity and interpreting the married women’s property
acts to leave that rule undisturbed.60 Interspousal tort immunity functioned to limit the reach of
the married women’s property acts and to preserve an important element of common law
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See id. at 1375 & nn.1-3.

56

See id. at 1500 & n.465.

57

See id. at 1494-95 & nn.444-45.

58

See sup ra text accompanying note 49.

59

See Carl T obias, Interspousal Tort Immu nity in America, 23 G A . L. R EV . 359, 375 (19 89) (“[N]o
legislation, as originally passed or even as amended until the twentieth century, specifically provided both for
personal injury actions and for such suits between husbands and wives.”).
60

See id. at 383-91.
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coverture. Today, notable aspects of this regime remain in place. At least eight states retain
some form of interspousal tort immunity, preserving a rule that courts created to protect
coverture in the face of the married women’s property acts.61
The prohibition on interspousal contracts for domestic services reflects a similar pattern.
Under common law coverture, a husband had a right to his wife’s domestic services. The
married women’s property acts, which granted wives the rights to contract and to keep their own
earnings,62 created the possibility that married women might be able to enter into enforceable
agreements with their husbands that entitled the women to compensation for their household
labor. Here too, however, courts quickly moved to protect a husband’s prerogatives under
common law coverture from the potential threat that the married women’s property acts posed.
Courts uniformly interpreted the married women’s property acts to prohibit interspousal contracts
for domestic services.63 Today, substantial elements of this regime remain. It is still the case that
no state is willing to enforce interspousal contracts for domestic services.64 Courts now phrase
the prohibition on these contracts in sex-neutral terms, explaining that each spouse has the right
to the other’s uncompensated domestic labor.65 But today, as in the nineteenth century, a wife is
much more likely to be the spouse who provides domestic services in marriage and is denied an
enforceable right to compensation for those services because of the prohibition on interspousal
contracts for domestic labor. In this way, the law continues to protect a husband’s right to his
wife’s domestic services.
Finally, let’s consider the doctrine of necessaries. This doctrine existed because coverture
denied married women the legal rights necessary to support themselves (the rights to keep their
own earnings, contract, sue, and own property), and also denied wives the right to sue their
husbands directly for support if support was not forthcoming. Under the doctrine of necessaries,
61

See sup ra text accompanying notes 32-33.

62

See sup ra text accompanying note 49.

63

See Reva B. Siegel, The M odern ization of M arital Status La w: Ad judicating Wives’ R ights to Ea rnings,
1860-1930, 82 G EO . L.J. 2127, 2127 -31 (1994).
64

See sup ra text accompanying notes 38-39.

65

See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) (“If the rule denying compensation
for support originated from considerations peculiar to women, this has no bearing on the rule’s gender-neutral
application today.”).
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a woman could buy necessary items from a third party on her husband’s credit, and if the
husband refused to pay the third party, the third party could sue the husband for the debt.66
Courts often contend that the judiciary created the doctrine of necessaries to mitigate the
harshness of coverture for married women.67 But from another perspective, the doctrine of
necessaries functioned to preserve the legal disabilities on married women, by giving wives a
means of securing support that did not challenge coverture and thus avoiding other possible
solutions to the problem of married women’s support.
Indeed, it is fair to say that the doctrine of necessaries was an attractive, or even a
plausible, answer to the problem of wifely support, only if one started from the premise that the
law needed to preserve married women’s legal disabilities by preventing them from suing their
husbands directly and by denying them the legal rights that made self-support possible. From the
start, the doctrine of necessaries had a tremendous flaw: It relied on third parties to enforce a
husband’s support obligation, but gave third parties little incentive to assume that function. A
merchant could collect for necessaries from a recalcitrant husband only if the merchant sued the
husband and won. Litigation would be costly, and the doctrine of necessaries gave merchants no
guarantee of success because it left the precise definition of a necessary expense unclear.68
Yet today, the doctrine of necessaries survives in some form in at least thirty-three
66

See H OMER H. C LARK, J R ., T HE L AW OF D OMESTIC R ELATIONS IN THE U N IT E D S TATES § 6.3, at 189-92
(1968); J O H N F. K ELLY , A T REATISE ON THE L AW OF C ON TRAC TS OF M A R R IE D W OMEN § 21 , at 164 -78 (J ersey C ity,
F.D. Linn & Co. 188 2); J AMES S CHOULER , A T REATISE ON THE L AW OF THE D OMESTIC R E LA T IO N S §§ 63-71, at 10119 (Bo ston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1895).
67

See, e.g., Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1993) (“The doctrine of necessaries
was deve loped to obviate some of the victimization which coverture would otherwise have permitted.”); M ed. Bus.
Assocs., Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (App. Div. 1992) (“[T]he necessaries doctrine served, in the words
of one commentator, as a ‘protective remedy for the hapless wife and children facing economic abandonment by the
husband.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 896 (“The necessaries doctrine originally evolved as a safeguard to ensure that
the essential needs of a d epend ent wife and children were pro vided for, and at the heart of this common law rule ‘is a
concern for the support and the sustenance of the family and the individual members thereof.’”) (citation omitted);
Land mark Med. C tr. v. Gauthier, 635 A .2d 1 145 , 115 0 (R.I. 199 4) (“T he do ctrine [o f necessaries] . . . attem pted to
‘obviate some of the victimization which coverture would otherwise have permitted’ . . . .”) (citation omitted).
68

Courts, for instance, adjusted their definition of a necessary item according to the married couple’s socioeconom ic class. See, e.g., C LARK, supra note 6 6, § 6 .3, at 19 0; K ELLY , supra note 66, § 21, at 167. This meant that
if a merchant suspected that a wom an’s husb and might no t pay her bills, the mercha nt had good reason to decline to
sell to that woma n, thus leaving her husband’s support ob ligation unenforced and the wife witho ut acce ss to
necessaries. A s the Iowa Su prem e Co urt noted as early as 1873 , a wife co uld “find it difficult, if not imp ossible, to
obtain a continuous support” through the doctrine of necessaries because “dealers and professional men would be
unwilling to supply their articles or services if thus compelled to resort to litigation in order to secure their pay.”
Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 31 0, 313 (187 3).
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states.69 Most states,70 although not all of them,71 have made the doctrine facially sex-neutral,
recognizing that modern sex discrimination jurisprudence is much more hostile to laws that draw
explicit sex-based distinctions.72 But even in states with facially-neutral doctrines of necessaries,
economic disparities between men and women make it much more likely that the spouse who
needs to rely on the doctrine of necessaries to have her necessary expenses paid will be the wife.
The modern doctrine of necessaries preserves a regime in which the spouse in need of support,
usually the wife, is unable to enforce her marital rights directly and instead has to make her
claims through third parties.
As these examples make clear, substantial evidence within family law documents the
persistence of rules and principles from common law coverture. The story of coverture’s demise
is embedded in the family law canon, but its description of family law is partial and misleading.
It overstates the changes that have occurred in family law over time, and excludes and obscures
the evidence indicating the persistence of inequality.

3.

Property Norms in the Law of Parenthood

A third story in the family law canon is that common law property norms no longer shape
the law of parenthood. This story contends that the law of parenthood is now structured around
children’s interests, having shed a common law tradition that used property norms to guide the
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See sup ra text accompanying notes 34-37.

70

For states that have doctrines of necessaries phrased in sex-neutral language, see sources cited supra
notes 34-37.
71

For states that still have sex-specific doctrines of necessaries, see sources cited supra note 36.

72

See, e.g., St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P .2d 1123 , 1128 (Ka n. 1992) (“W e hold the
doctrine of necessaries in its historical form violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendm ent, and
we hereby expand the comm on-law doctrine to apply to husbands and wives equally.”); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v.
Ho lbrook, 663 A .2d 1 344 , 134 6 (N .H. 1995 ) (“W e find that as traditionally form ulated, the necessaries doc trine is
unconstitutional, and sho uld be revised to impose reciproca l responsibilities upon husbands and wives.”); M ed. Bus.
Assocs., Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d 89 0, 890 (App . Div. 1992) (“[W ]e find that as traditionally formulated, the
necessaries doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause, and that its unconstitutionality should be remedied by
extending the common-law rule to both spouses.”); Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tenn. 1983) (“To
impose liability upon the husband for providing necessaries to his wife while denying such liability of the wife for
providing necessaries to her husband . . . cannot pass constitutional muster under the equal protection guarantees of
the state and federal constitutions . . . .”).
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law of parenthood and that granted parents (especially fathers) rights of custody and control over
their children that were strong enough to be the functional equivalent of property rights. Much
like the story of the end of coverture, this story is presented as a narrative of progress and
equality. It asserts that a common law regime that failed to recognize children’s legitimate
interests has been supplanted by a legal order that prioritizes children’s interests.
Reiterations of this story appear throughout family law scholarship, family law
casebooks, and family law jurisprudence. Family law scholars state that the law of parenthood
has rejected a common law tradition “[m]oored in the medieval equation of legal rights with
property ownership.”73 They explain that the law of parenthood has “shift[ed] away from its
emphasis on married fathers’ common law rights to a view of children with interests of their
own.”74 Family law casebooks similarly report that the law of parenthood has “shift[ed]” from a
regime that treated children as “chattels” rather than “persons.”75 They note that “[h]istorically,
the law regarded children as the property of their parents, particularly of their father,” and declare
that “[t]oday, the law increasingly views children as individuals with their own distinct
interests.”76 Courts agree that “[p]arents do not have a property right in their children” under the
modern law of parenthood,77 that “[n]either parent’s interests with regard to his or her children
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M ICHA EL G ROSSBERG , G OVERNING THE H EARTH : L AW AND
A MERICA 235 (198 5).

THE

F A M IL Y IN N INETEENTH -C ENTURY

74

Judith T. Y ounger, Responsible Parents and Good Ch ildren, 14 LA W & I NEQ . 489 , 497 (1996); see also
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal
Parentage, 113 H ARV . L. R EV . 835 , 864 (2000) (“W hile the legal system of the feudal era accorded a family
patriarch the right to bind his children as he saw fit, that time has long since passed. Today, parents’ rights are
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perhaps m ore so than at an y time in our history — courts and comm entators hold that parents’ rights a re secondary to
childre n’s interests.” ); Morse, supra note 20, at 321 (“[I]t is no longer possible to view children as objects who can
be regulated without regard for their wishes and liberty.”).
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W EYRAUCH , supra note 4, at 670.
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are a property right,”78 that “‘[a] child is not a chattel’” in contemporary family law.79
In recounting the demise of common law property norms, scholars and courts rely on the
law of child custody as their central source of evidence. Scholars observe that the law of child
custody has moved “from father’s property to children’s rights.”80 They declare that child
custody determinations are now based on “the best-interests-of-the-child.”81 They insist that the
common law of parenthood was replaced by “an entirely new standard of child placement” in
“which the highest priority was the child’s interests.”82 Courts similarly stress that custody
determinations “subordinate” a parent’s interests and allocate custody according to “a
determination of the best interests of the child,”83 that “‘the welfare of the child is the
determining factor’” in establishing child custody,84 that “[w]hatever claim [parents] may make
for either custody or visitation rights, is to be tested by what is in the best interest of the child.”85
The law of parenthood has changed over time, and the emergence, since the middle of the
nineteenth century, of child custody cases purporting to apply a “best interests of the child”
standard is a significant development. But the canonical story of the demise of common law
property norms importantly misdescribes family law and its governing principles. It overstates
the changes that have occurred in family law over time. Here too, there is substantial evidence
within family law to support an excluded counter-narrative: the story of the persistence of
common law property norms in the law of parenthood. Parents retain substantial elements of
many of their common law rights, even where those rights potentially conflict with their
children’s interests. Let’s examine, for instance, parents’ custody rights, rights to inflict corporal
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Raymond v. Raymo nd, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (Conn. 19 74).

79

Olinghouse v. Olinghouse, 908 P.2d 280 , 286 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995 ) (quoting Commonwe alth ex rel.
Berg v. Catholic Bureau, 76 A.2d 4 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950 )).
80

M A R Y A N N M A S O N , F R O M F ATHER ’S P R O P ER T Y
C USTODY IN THE U N IT E D S TATES (1994).

TO

C HILDREN ’S R IGHTS : T HE H ISTORY O F C HILD

81

Yo unger, supra note 74, at 497 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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G ROSSBERG , supra note 73, at 234-35.
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Raymond, 345 A.2d at 52.
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Olingh ouse, 908 P.2d at 286 (quoting Com monwealth ex rel. Berg , 76 A.2d at 427).
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In re E.F.V., 461 A.2d 1263, 12 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983 ).
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punishment, rights to control their children’s labor, and rights to immunity from tort liability for
injuring their children.
We can start with the law of custody. Courts and scholars reporting the demise of
common law property norms take the law of child custody as their central illustration, yet a large
portion of child custody law does not actually turn on a child’s interests. These interests may
help settle custody disputes between two biological parents, where a reliance on parental rights
cannot decide the dispute. But today, as at common law,86 a child’s interests are not the central
concern of suits in which the state seeks to take permanent custody from parents, and they do not
guide most custody disputes between biological parents and third parties. The key question in
these cases is not where the child would be best off. Instead, these cases focus on a parent’s
rights, and protect those rights unless the state or third parties can meet a very high evidentiary
burden to prove parental unfitness. As the Supreme Court has explained, for example, parental
termination proceedings do not consider “whether the natural parents” or some other caretakers
“would provide the better home” for a child. A child can be “deeply interested in the outcome”
of a parental termination proceeding, yet “the focus emphatically is not on” him.87 Parental
termination proceedings revolve around the parent’s “fundamental” right to his child,88 and
uphold that right unless there is “clear and convincing evidence”89 of “parental unfitness.”90
Many courts deciding custody disputes between parents and third parties similarly report that
“[t]he issue is not which side would provide the better home for the child.”91 These courts
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See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental
Relations, 90 G EO . L.J. 299, 312 (200 2) (“As one state supreme court summarized the premise guiding
nineteenth-century custody decisions at common law, ‘it would not do’ to deprive a biological parent of his custodial
authority simply because his children were, ‘in the ordinary estimation, . . . neglected, and . . . the popular verdict
would declare that they would be better off, and stand a better chance of becoming useful members of society, if they
were removed from the pernicious influence of their parents.’ A biological parent could only lose custody for
behavior that was ‘sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong to meet the condemnation of all decent and
law-abiding people.’”) (footnotes omitted).
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Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 759 (1982 ).
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Id. at 753, 759.
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Id. at 748.
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Id. at 760.
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In re Feemster, 751 S.W .2d 772, 773 (Mo. Ct. App . 1988).
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enforce the rights of parents and award them custody against third parties, in the absence of
“clear and conclusive” “[e]vidence of unfitness.”92 In this way, parents continue to enjoy
substantial rights to the custody of their children simply by virtue of their status as parents.
Let’s turn to the law of corporal punishment, where parents also retain essential elements
of their common law rights. At common law, a parent had the right to physically chastise his
child. Courts and legal commentators endorsed physical chastisement as a way of securing a
child’s obedience to his parent’s authority, and never required a parent to establish that the
chastisement was in the child’s best interests. The exact scope of a parent’s common law right of
correction varied modestly over time, but it was always wide-ranging. By the end of the
nineteenth century, a majority of common law courts held that a parent could inflict reasonable or
moderate correction on his child, and rarely convicted a parent for exceeding the bounds of
reasonableness or moderation.93 Today, every state still recognizes a parent’s authority to impose
corporal punishment on his child. At least thirty states and the District of Columbia, for instance,
have codified a parent’s right to inflict “reasonable” corporal punishment.94 At least thirteen
states have codified a parent’s right to impose corporal punishment in slightly different terms.95
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Haralson v. Haralson, 595 P.2d 443, 445 (Okla. 1979).
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See Hasday, supra note 86, at 310-11, 314-17.
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See A LA . C O D E § 13 A-3-2 4(1) (1994); A LASKA S TAT . § 11 .81.4 30(a)(1) (M ichie 2002 ); A RIZ . R EV . S TAT .
A N N . § 13 -403 (1) (W est 2001); A RK . C ODE A N N . § 5-2-605 (1) (M ichie 1997 ); C AL. W ELF . & I NST . C O D E § 300(a)
(W est 1998); C OLO . R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 18 -1-70 3(1)(a) (W est 1999); C O N N . G EN . S TAT . A N N . § 53a-18(1) (W est
200 1); D EL. C ODE A N N . tit. 11, § 468(1) (2001); D.C. C ODE A N N . § 16 -230 1(23)(B )(i) (Supp. 2 003 ); H AW . R EV .
S TAT . § 70 3-30 9(1) (1993); I D A H O C O D E § 16 -200 2(e) (M ichie Supp. 200 3); I N D . C ODE A N N . § 31-34-1-15(1)
(W est 1999); L A . R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 14 :18(4) (W est 1997); M E . R EV . S TAT . A N N . tit. 17-A, § 106(1) (W est 1983);
M D . C ODE A N N ., F AM . L AW § 4-5 01(b)(2 ) (Sup p. 20 02); M ICH . C O M P . L AWS A N N . § 750.136b(7) (West Supp.
200 3); M IN N . S TAT . A N N . § 60 9.06 (1)(6 ) (W est 2003); M ISS . C ODE A N N . § 43 -21-1 05(m) (2000 ); M O . A N N . S TAT . §
210.110(1) (West 1996); N.H. R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 627:6(I) (1996); N.Y. P EN AL L AW § 35.10(1) (M cKinney 1998);
N.D. C E N T. C O D E § 12 .1-05 -05(1 ) (1997); O R . R EV . S TAT . § 161.205(1) (2001); S.C. C ODE A N N . § 20-7-490(2)(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002); S.D. C O D IF IE D L A W S § 22 -18-5 (M ichie 1998 ); T E N N . C ODE A N N . § 39-15-401(b)(1)
(1997); T EX . F AM . C ODE A N N . § 26 1.00 1(1)(C) (Vernon 200 2); U T A H C ODE A N N . § 76 -2-40 1 (Su pp. 2 003 ); W ASH .
R EV . C ODE A N N . § 26 .44.0 15 (W est 1997); W IS . S TAT . A N N . § 93 9.45 (5) (W est 1996); W Y O . S TAT . A N N . § 14-3202(a)(ii) (Michie 2003).
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These states protect all parental corporal punishment that is “ordinary,” O KLA . S TAT . A N N . tit. 21, § 844
(West 2002), or not “excessive,” 705 I LL. C O M P . S TAT . 405 /2-3(2 )(v) (2002 ); N EV . R EV . S TAT . 432B.15 0 (2001 );
O H IO R EV . C ODE A N N . § 2919.22(B )(3) (Anderson 2003 ); R.I. G EN . L A W S § 40-11-2 (1)(i)-(ii) (S upp. 200 2); W . V A .
C ODE A N N . § 49-1-3(a) (Michie 2001), or not “unnecessarily severe,” N.J. S TAT . A N N . § 9:6-1 (West 2002), or not
“cruel and inhuman,” K AN . S TAT . A N N . § 21-3609 (1995), or does not cause a certain level of physical or mental
injury, see F LA . S TAT . A N N . § 39 .01(2) (W est 2003); G A . C ODE A N N . § 19 -15-1 (3)(A ) (1999); K Y . R EV . S TAT . A N N .
§ 50 3.11 0(1) (M ichie 1999 ); M ASS . A N N . L A W S ch. 119, § 51A (Law. Co-op. 2002); 18 P A . C O N S . S TAT . A N N . §
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These statutes preserve a substantial portion of the common law regime.
Parents have similarly maintained important aspects of their common law right to control
their child’s labor. Child labor laws have modified rather than eliminated the almost absolute
authority that a parent (particularly a father) exercised over his child’s labor at common law, so
that parents still retain significant control over their children’s work.96 Federal law, for example,
gives parents who employ their children more power than other employers, and allows parents to
consent to their children’s exemption from important labor protections. A child working for his
parent on the parent’s farm is not protected by federal law’s minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements,97 by federal law’s prohibition on child labor before the age of twelve,98 or by
federal law’s ban on employing children under sixteen in “particularly hazardous” occupations.99
A parent can authorize his child to work anywhere in agriculture at the age of twelve or
thirteen,100 and can authorize a child younger than twelve to work on many farms that the parent
does not own,101 even though federal law generally prohibits agricultural labor until a child
reaches fourteen.102 A child who works on the same farm that employs his parent is also often
excluded from federal law’s minimum wage and maximum hour protections.103 A similar pattern
appears in state labor laws.104 Following a course begun at common law, none of these statutes

509(1) (W est 1998).
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On the common law, see 1 B L AC K ST O N E, supra note 40, at *441.
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See 29 U.S.C. § 21 3(a)(6)(B) (2000 ).
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See id. § 213(c)(1)(A).
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Id. § 213(c)(2).
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See id. § 213(c)(1)(B ).
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See id. § 213(c)(1)(A).
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See id. § 213(c)(1)(C).
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See id. § 213(a)(6)(D ).
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California, for instance, exem pts a parent who em ploys his child in “agricultural, horticultural,
viticultural, or do mestic labor” from otherw ise app licable restriction s on ch ild labo r. C AL. L AB . C O D E § 1394(a)
(W est Supp. 2003). Parents in South Dakota can employ their children in an “occupation dangerous to life, health,
or morals,” although other employers cannot do so until the child reaches sixteen. S.D. C O D IF IE D L A W S § 60 -12-3
(M ichie 1993 ). A pa rent in Arkansa s can emplo y his child b efore the age of fourteen, eve n though the state
otherwise prohib its child lab or before fourteen. See A RK . C O D E . A N N . § 11-6-104 (M ichie 2002).

29

requires a showing that the parent is acting in his child’s interests. All accord a parent significant
control over his child’s labor simply because of his status as a parent.
Finally, a parent’s immunity from tort liability for injuring his child represents an
example where the legal rights that parents exercise over their children have actually grown over
time. No state recognized parental tort immunity until 1891, when the Mississippi Supreme
Court created parental tort immunity to protect a parent’s authority “to care for, guide, and
control” his child, and to enforce a child’s “obligation to aid and comfort and obey” his parent.105
Courts throughout the nation followed by adopting their own doctrines of parental tort immunity,
and today at least twenty-seven states recognize some form of the immunity. Some states, for
instance, exempt a parent from tort liability if he exercises legal control over his child.106 Some
states limit the parental conduct that can be the basis of a child’s suit.107 In enforcing these
doctrines of parental tort immunity, courts often explain that they are acting to protect “parental
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Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (M iss. 1891).
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They hold that a child cannot bring a negligence suit against his parent unless the negligence occurred
after the child reached the age of majority, see Renko v. M cLean, 697 A.2d 468, 472 -73 (Md . 1997); W arren v.
W arren, 650 A.2d 25 2, 255-56 (M d. 1994), or that a child cannot bring any tort suit against his parent unless the
child is emancipated or the parent do es not have legal custo dy and contro l, see L A . R EV . S TAT . A N N . § 9:571 (W est
2000).
107

They hold , for example , that a child canno t bring a tort suit aga inst his parent “‘where parental contro l,
authority, or discretion is involved.’” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Huang, 652 A.2d 568, 572 (Del. 1995) (citation
omitted); see also Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 728-29 (Ill. 1993); Smith v. Smith, 646 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Iowa
2002); Lewis v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Ky. 1996); Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73
(M ich. 19 72); Bro adwell v. Ho lmes, 871 S .W .2d 4 71, 4 76-7 7 (T enn. 1994 ). They refuse to hear a child’s tort suit
against a parent for any injury except sexual abuse, established by “‘clear and convincing’” evidence. Hurst v.
Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (per curiam). They immunize parents from their children’s tort suits for
negligent supervision, see Brunner v. Hutchinson Div., Lear-Siegler, Inc., 770 F. Supp . 517, 518 (D .S.D. 1991);
Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 732 A.2d 767, 770-73 (Conn. 1999); Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550, 551-52
(Idaho 1985); Cooley v. Hosier, 659 N.E.2d 1127, 1129, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d
1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983); Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 340 (N.Y. 1974); Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826
S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1992); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 713 P.2d 79, 83 (Wash. 1986)
(en banc), o r for any kind o f negligent cond uct, see Blake v. Blake, 508 S.E.2d 443, 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998), or for
any kind of uninsu red negligent cond uct, see Fields v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 87 S.W.3d 22 4, 228, 231 (A rk.
2002); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 781 So. 2d 1070, 1077, 1078 n.17 (Fla. 2001), or for any kind of negligent conduct that
doe s not invo lve an automobile accid ent, see Doe v. Ho lt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 512 -13 (N.C. 1992 ); Courtney v.
Courtney, 413 S .E.2d 41 8, 42 7 (W . Va. 1 991 ), appeal after remand, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1993), an insured
autom obile accident, see Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 909, 916 (Mass. 1975); Sixkiller v. Summers, 680
P.2d 36 0, 36 0-61 (Okla. 1984), or the p arent’s b usiness o r emp loyment, see Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d
929 , 933 , 936 -37 (C olo. 1 994 ) (en banc); see also Pavlick v. Pavlick, 491 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Va. 1997) (noting that
Virginia’s doctrine of parental tort immunity bars a child’s tort suit against his parent for negligence unless the
negligence involves an automobile accident or a “business related situation”).
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authority,”108 to maintain parental “discipline and control,”109 and “[i]n the interest of preserving
the unqualified right of parents to reasonably discipline their children.”110 With these doctrines,
state courts have actually augmented the rights that a parent enjoys at common law.
The canonical story of the demise of common law property norms significantly
misrepresents much of family law and its animating principles. Parents have retained (or
sometimes expanded upon) important aspects of many of their common law rights, even when
those rights are potentially inconsistent with their children’s interests.
As we have seen, this pattern is systemic. Each of these stories that legal authorities and
legal scholars regularly invoke to describe family law and its animating principles presents a
partial and even misleading picture of the field and its governing tenets. Each overstates the
changes that have occurred in family law over time. Each excludes and denies the evidence
documenting the persistence of inequality within family law.

B.

Understating Distinctions Between Families

In addition to overstating the changes that have occurred in family law over time, the
family law canon also understates the distinctions that family law currently draws between
families. For instance, the canonical examples that legal authorities and legal scholars constantly
employ to illustrate and reveal the relationship between family law and social inequality
highlight—or are interpreted by legal authorities and legal scholars to highlight—the ways in
which family law no longer draws distinctions between families. Family law authorities and
scholars rarely discuss examples that would bring to light the continued distinctions that family
law makes between families. Let’s begin by examining some of the examples within the family
law canon, and then turn to some of the excluded examples.
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Crotta, 732 A.2d at 773 (citatio n and internal q uotatio n marks om itted); see also Terror Mining Co., 866
P.2d at 936 (same); Renko, 697 A.2d at 470 (sam e); Doe, 418 S.E.2 d at 514 (same); Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 936
(same).
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Blake, 508 S.E.2 d at 444; see also Sorensen, 339 N.E .2d at 916 (noting that parental tort immunity
protects “‘parental authority and discipline’”) (citation omitted); Foldi, 461 A.2d at 115 2 (noting that parental tort
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Hurst, 539 So. 2d at 266.
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1.

The Canonical Examples

Examples involving race and, increasingly, examples involving sexual orientation are
canonical in family law. Legal authorities and legal scholars consistently cite them to explain
family law’s relationship to social inequality.
Consider, for instance, the role that the example of interracial marriage has assumed in
the family law jurisprudence and literature. Statutes prohibiting interracial marriage (commonly
known as anti-miscegenation laws)111 swept much of the nation after the Civil War,112 and were
still in place in sixteen states in 1967.113 That year, the Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia
that anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.114 Legal
authorities and legal scholars consistently identify Loving as one of the most crucial decisions in
family law, illuminating family law’s nature and core values. Scholars report that “[n]o
respectable scholar disputes the correctness of Loving,”115 and declare that “any constitutional
theory that cannot support [Loving’s] result is a constitutional theory that should not be
supported.”116 Courts and judges agree, condemning and rejecting legal arguments if they
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On the origins of the term “miscegenation” (a pejorative), see Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. R EV . 1297, 1343 n.166 (1998 ).
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903-04 (19 95).
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suggest that Loving was wrongly decided.117 The family law jurisprudence118 and literature119
117

See, e.g., Planned Parentho od v. Casey, 505 U.S. 83 3, 847 -48 (19 92) (“It is also tempting . . . to suppo se
that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected
against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendm ent was ratified. But such a
view would be inconsisten t with our law. It is a promise of the C onstitution that there is a realm of person al liberty
which the governm ent may not enter. W e have vindicated this princip le befo re. M arriage is mentio ned nowh ere in
the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt
correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the
Due Pro cess Clause in Loving v. Virgin ia.”) (citations omitted); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the
passio ns with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s scrutiny. See , e.g., Roe v. Wade;
Lov ing v. Virgin ia; Brown v. Board of Education.”) (citations omitted); id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our
prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”).
118

For so me o f the case law debating what Loving suggests about prohibitions on same-sex marriage, see
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“[W ]hile Loving expanded the traditional
scope of the fundamental right to marry by granting interracial couples unrestricted access to the state-sanctioned
marriage institution, that decision was anchored to the concept of marriage as a union involving persons of the
opposite sex. In contrast, recognizing a right to marry someone of the same sex would not expand the established
right to m arry, but would redefine the legal mea ning of ‘marriag e.’ W e therefore conclude that Loving does not
mandate a conclusion that the fundamental right to choose one’s spouse necessarily includes the choice to enter a
same-sex marriage.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A .2d 307, 359 (D.C. 1995 ) (Ferren, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[T]here is no convincing basis for saying . . . that marriage and homosexuality, by
definition, cannot fit together. This analysis is akin to the premise of the trial court opinion the Supreme Co urt
rejected in Loving: that a divine natural ord er forb ids racial intermarriage to the point of m aking it co ncep tually
unthinkable.”); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P .2d 4 4, 67 -68 (H aw. 19 93) (“W e understand that Jud ge H een d isagree s with
our view . . . based on his belief that ‘[Hawaii’s prohibition on same-sex marriage] treats everyone alike and applies
equally to both sexes[.]’ . . . The rationale underlying Judge Heen’s belief, however, was expressly considered and
rejected in Loving . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N .E.2d 941, 95 8 (Ma ss. 2003) (“As both Perez
and Loving make clear, the right to marry me ans little if it does not include the right to marry the person o f one’s
choice, subject to a ppropriate governm ent restrictions in the interests o f public health, safety, and w elfare. In this
case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives individuals o f access to an institution of fundam ental legal, personal,
and social significance—the institution of marriage—because of a single trait: skin color in Perez and Loving, sexual
orientation here. As it did in Perez and Loving, history must yield to a more fully developed understanding of the
invidious quality of the discrimination.”) (citations omitted); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971)
(“Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute, prohibiting interracial marriages, was invalidated [in Loving] solely on the
grounds of its patent racial discrimination. . . . [I]n commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear
distinction between a marital re striction b ased merely upon race and o ne ba sed upon the fundamental difference in
sex.”); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, slip op. at 52-53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (“The Supreme
Court’s decision in Loving v. Virgin ia is predicated entirely on the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial
classifications. . . . No similar Constitutional provision accords heightened protection to individuals who claim that
statutes discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. . . . The comparison plaintiffs seek to draw between New
Jersey’s statute limiting marria ge to m ixed-gender couples and V irginia’s law prohibiting interracial marriage is
flawed as a matter of legal principle.”) (citation omitted); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999)
(“Although the concurring and dissenting opinion invokes the United States Supreme Court decision in Loving v.
Virginia, the reliance is misplaced. There the high court had little difficulty in looking behind the superficial
neutrality of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute to hold that its real purpose was to maintain the pernicious
doctrine of white supremacy. Our colleague argues, by analogy, that the effect, if not the purpose, of the exclusion
of same-sex partners from the marriage laws is to maintain certain male and female stereotypes to the detriment of
both. . . . The evidence does not demonstrate such a purpose.”) (citations omitted); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1192 (W ash. Ct. App. 1974) (“In Loving . . . , the parties were barred from entering into the m arriage relationship
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debate Loving’s implications for other disputes in family law, such as the dispute over
prohibitions on same-sex marriage, on the premise that any family law rule is deeply suspect if it
cannot be reconciled with the Loving decision.
Scholars use the example of interracial marriage to stress how family law no longer draws
distinctions between families. As they note, anti-miscegenation laws “have been leveled.”120
Family law no longer bans “color-blind romance”121 or “forbid[s] culturally integrated marriages
by mandating segregationist associations.”122
The debate on interracial adoption is just one place in family law where the influence of
the interracial marriage example, with its focus on vanquished distinctions between families, is
evident. Many states historically prohibited interracial adoption by statute or avoided it as a

because of an impermissible racial classification. There is no analogous sexual classification involved in the instant
case because appellants are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are
being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one
which may be entered into only by two persons who are membe rs of the opposite sex.”).
119

For some of the extensive literature debating Loving’s implications for same-sex marriage, see
E SKRIDGE , supra note 115, at 11 (“The arguments rejected by the [Loving] Court are eerily similar to those advanced
by trad itionalist oppo nents of same-se x marriage.”); G E R ST M A N N , supra note 42, at 49 (“A . . . problem with the
Loving analogy is that anti-miscegenation laws and the same-sex marriage b an are fundamentally different laws. . . .
The principal purpose of the anti-miscegenation laws was to segre gate the races. The requirement that marriage be
gend er neutral has the opp osite purpo se: it is meant to bring men and wom en together.”); M ARK S TRASSER , L EGA LLY
W ED : S A M E-S EX M ARRIAGE AND THE C O N S TIT U TIO N 66 (1997 ) (“There are numerous reasons why the best analogue
to the current state refusal to recognize intrasexual marriages is the former state refusal to recognize interracial
marriages. Many of the same reasons justifying the Court’s striking down antimiscegenation statutes justify striking
dow n laws p rohib iting same-sex m arriage s.”); David O rgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage
and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. P U B . L. 201, 235 (1998) (“There is no straightforward relationship between
Lov ing v. Virgin ia and Baehr v. Miike[, which considered Hawaii’s same-sex marriage prohibition].”); Josephine
Ross, Riddle for Our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscegenation Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, 54
R UTGERS L. R EV . 999 , 100 9-10 (2002) (“Sam e-sex m arriage cases are a log ical extension o f the princ iples of Loving
v. Virg inia, for both its holdings: (1) Even though the statute effects African-Americans and whites, it still constitutes
a racial classification which must be justified under a highe r burd en of p roof; and (2 ) There is a fundam ental right to
marry.”); Lynn D. W ardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. R EV .
1, 77-78 (“The Loving analogy between antimiscegenation laws and laws allowing only hetero sexual marriage fails
as a matter of case interpretation and constitutional doctrine. . . . [T]he language of Loving is specifically targeted at
racism , not at other categories of classification.”); Jam es Trosino , Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage
and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. R EV . 93, 120 (1993) (“[T]he reasons used for prohibiting gay couples
from marrying seem strikingly similar to arguments used to prohibit interracial marriage. Hopefully, an unbiased,
compassionate judiciary will learn the lessons of the past and not repeat the miscegenation mistake in the context of
gay marriage.”).
120

K E N N ED Y , supra note 116, at 35.
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Jim C hen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. R EV . 145, 165 (19 94).

122

W ardle, supra note 119, at 81.
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matter of practice,123 but some states and adoption agencies had become more favorably inclined
toward interracial adoption by the early 1970s.124 The modern debate over interracial adoption
coalesced after the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) issued a position
paper in 1972 that denounced interracial adoption as a “form of genocide” and declared “that
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster care or for
adoption.”125 This position, which the NABSW reaffirmed in the 1980s and 1990s,126 has
attracted tremendous scholarly and official attention, most of it negative.127 In explaining their
123

See, e.g., J OYCE A. L ADNER , M IX E D F AMILIES : A DOPTING A CROSS R AC IAL B OUND ARIES 67 (1977 ) (“In
the late 1940s and early 1950s there were no official policies in adoption agencies that permitted whites to adopt
black children.”); 1 M ICHA EL S CHAPIRO , A S TUD Y O F A D O P TIO N P RACTICE : A D O P TIO N A GENCIES AND THE C HILDREN
T H E Y S ERVE 83-84 (195 6) (reporting results of 1954 survey of adoption agencies in which 240 of 250 responding
agencies identified “R acial background” as factor “w hich they considered imp ortant when se lecting adop tive parents
for a child”); id. at 85 (“Even though ten agencies reported they did not consider racial background important, we
know from p ractice that agencies are not placing Negro children in white ho mes o r white ch ildren in Negro home s.
Som e agencies use hom es for children of mixe d racial background w here the bac kground o f the ado ptive p arents is
not the same as the child’s. Ho wever, in most instances the cha racteristics of the child are prima rily white, for this
kind o f placement occurs more frequently with children of mixe d O riental or Indian and white background, than with
children in whom the non-Caucasian blood is Negro. In fact, in many of the Southern states, placement of a child of
mixed Negro and white blood is prohibited by law.”).
124

See, e.g., L ADNER , supra note 1 23, at 77 (“B y 197 0 transracial adop tions had occurred in every state
except Alabam a, Arkansas, L ouisiana, M ississippi, and South C arolina .”); R ITA J AMES S IM O N & H O W A R D A LT ST EIN ,
T RA NS RA CIAL A D O P TIO N , at vii (1977) (“W e started collecting information for this book in 1972 . At that time, the
transracial adoption of American black and Indian children and of children from South East Asia by white families
had been contributing significantly to the removal of ‘hard to place children’ from public institutions into permanent
family settings.”); id. at 4 (“W hen the field work for the survey began in 1971, transracial adoption was a much
pub licized, rather extensive ly used p rocedure for rem oving nonw hite children from institution s and placing them in
nuclear family settings. It continued to gain momentum for a few more years.”).
125

Position paper developed at the National Association of Black Social Workers’ Conference in Nashville,
Tenn., Ap ril 4-9, 1972 , reprinted in id. at 50, 50, 52.
126

See Barriers to Adoption: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labo r and Huma n Resources, 99th
Cong. 213 (1 985) (statement of W illiam T. M erritt, President, Nationa l Association of B lack Social Wo rkers) (“W e
have an ethnic, moral and professional obligation to oppose transracial adoption. We are, therefore, legally justified
in our efforts to protect the rights of black children, black families and the black community. We view the placement
of black children in white homes as a hostile act against our community. It is a blatant form of race and cultural
geno cide, and we are no t alone in our stance regarding efforts to preserve and p rotect the blac k com munity fro m all
possible forms of destruc tion.”); N ATIO NA L A SSOC IATION OF B LACK S OC IAL W ORKERS , P O S IT IO N S T A TE M E N T:
P RESERVING A FRICAN -A M E R IC A N F AMILIES 5 (1994) (“N ABS W believes, as do many child welfare organizations
and professionals, that ‘it is in the best interest of children to place them with appropriate families of the same race,
culture, and national origin.’ NABSW believes it is the right of a child to be raised in a permanent, loving home
which reflects the same ethnic or racial group.”) (footnote omitted).
127
The vast majority of scholarly opinion condemns laws and practices that prohibit or disfavor interracial
ado ption. See, e.g., E L IZ AB E TH B ARTHOLET , F A M IL Y B O N D S : A DOPTION AND THE P OLITICS O F P A R EN T IN G 112, 115
(1993) [hereinafter B ARTHOLET , F A M IL Y B O N D S ]; K E N N ED Y , supra note 1 16, at 416; R. Richard Banks, The Color of
Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 Y ALE L.J. 875,
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opposition to prohibitions on interracial adoption, scholars repeatedly observe that Loving has
virtually eliminated legal distinctions between families based on racial composition, and that the
remaining policies and practices disfavoring interracial adoption are last vestiges of an old issue.
Loving, they explain, already stands for the principle that “[t]he government cannot promote
racial separatism in private life.”128
Scholars similarly use the increasingly canonical example of same-sex marriage to stress
the ways in which family law no longer makes distinctions between families. This is particularly
striking because the law of same-sex marriage represents an important continued distinction that
family law explicitly draws between families. The District of Columbia and every state in the
nation except for Massachusetts prohibit same-sex marriages.129 Only Vermont allows a same-

943 (1998); Chen , supra note 1 21, at 168 ; Rita J. Simon & H oward Altstein, The Relevance of Race in Adoption
Law and Social Practice, 11 N OTRE D AME J.L. E THICS & P U B . P O L’Y 171, 178-79, 194 (1997). Federal law,
moreover, has provided since 1996 that states and organizations receiving federal funding cannot deny or delay an
adoption (involving a non-Native American child) based on the race, color, or national origin of the child or the
prospective adoptive parent, see Small Business Job Protection Act of 19 96, P ub. L. No. 104 -188 , § 18 08, 1 10 S tat.
1755, 19 03-04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6 71(a)(18), 674(d )(4), 1996b(1), 199 6b(3) (200 0)), although many
observers believe that some states and adoption agencies continue to disfavor interracial adoption as a matter of
policy or practice, see Implementation of the Interethnic Adoption Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 34-35 (20 00) (statement of Howard
Metzenbaum, form er Senator); K E N N ED Y , supra note 1 16, at 400 ; Elizab eth B artholet, Correspondence, Priva te
Race Preferences in Family Formation, 107 Y ALE L.J. 2351, 2354 (1998).
128

B ARTHOLET , F A M IL Y B O N D S , supra note 1 27, at 106 ; see also Chen, supra note 121, at 168 (“Accepting
the premises underlying the racial fundamentalists’ opposition to transracial adoption dictates a rejection of
Loving.”).
129
For some of the case law recognizing and upholding prohibitions on same-sex marriage, see Standhardt
v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 453 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]e are asked to declare that Arizona’s prohibition of
same-sex marriages . . . violates the federal and state constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we hold that
Arizona’s prohibition of such state-licensed unions does not violate Petitioners’ rights under either constitution.”);
Dean v. D istrict of Co lumbia, 653 A.2 d 30 7, 30 8 (D .C. 19 95) (per curiam); id. at 318, 33 1 (Fe rren, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining the court’s conclusions “that no legislature for the District of
Columbia— Congress or Counc il—has ever intend ed to sanction same-sex m arriage s” and “that same-sex m arriage is
not a ‘fundamental right’ protected by the due process clause, because that kind of relationship is not ‘deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition’”) (citation om itted); Jones v. Ha llahan, 501 S.W .2d 58 8, 590 (Ky. 197 3) (“W e
find no constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex. . . . In
substance, the relationship proposed b y the appellants do es not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because
what they propose is not a marriage.”); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W .2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971) (“W e hold . . . that
Minn.St. c. 517 does not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex and that such marriages are
accordingly prohibited. . . . We [also] hold . . . that Minn.St. c. 517 does not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth, or
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, slip op. at 32 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003 ) (“[T]his court finds that like the federal law, in the State of New Jersey there is no
statutory or constitutional basis to recognize same-sex marriage.”); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup.
Ct. 1996) (“W e conclude that New Yo rk does not recognize or authorize same sex marriage and that the City Clerk
correctly refuse d to issue the license.”); S inger v. H ara, 522 P .2d 1 187 , 119 7 (W ash. Ct. App . 197 4) (“[W ]e hold

36

sex couple to enter into a civil union that gives the parties to the civil union all of the rights and
responsibilities associated with marriage under state law, except the right to identify themselves
as married.130 But as the issue of same-sex marriage has moved to the forefront of family law
jurisprudence and especially family law scholarship,131 scholars have consistently identified
same-sex marriage prohibitions as “vestiges” of a scheme of legal distinctions between families
that family law has otherwise left almost entirely behind.132 On this account, “lesbians and gay

that the trial court correctly concluded that the state’s denial of a marriage license to appellants [a same-sex couple]
is required by our state statutes and permitted by both the state and federal constitutions.”).
In Go odridge v. Department of P ublic Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court “declare[d] that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution,” id. at 969.
The court stayed entry of its judgment “for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem
appropriate in light of this opinion.” Id. at 970. After Goodridge was decided, the Massachusetts Senate considered
a bill that would have “‘p rohib it[ed] same-sex couples from entering into marriage but allow[ed] them to form civil
unions with all ‘benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities’ of marriage.’” Opinions of the Justices to the
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004 ) (quoting Senate order). The Massachusetts Senate asked the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion o n the bill, see id., and the court concluded that the
bill wou ld “violate[] the equa l protection and due process requ irements of the C onstitution of the C omm onwealth
and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,” id. at 572.
A Massachusetts citizen and a group of Massachusetts legislators brought suit in federal court arguing that
the remedy the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted in Goodridge violated the Guarantee Clause of the
United States Co nstitution. See Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 222 (1st Cir. 2004) (per
curiam ). But the United S tates Court of App eals for the First C ircuit rejected this contention. See id. at 229 (“The
resolution of the same-sex ma rriage issu e by the judicial branch of the Massachusetts go vernm ent, subject to
override by the voters through the state constitutional amendment process, does not plausibly constitute a threat to a
republican form o f government. Absent such a threa t, our fed eral co nstitutional system simply do es not perm it a
federal court to intervene in the arrangem ent of state governm ent under the guise of a federal G uarantee C lause
question.”).
130

See V T . S TAT . A N N . tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002). Vermont’s provision for same-sex civil unions was
prompted b y the Vermont Supreme Co urt’s decision in Baker v. S tate, 744 A.2d 86 4 (Vt. 1999), which held that the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires Vermont “to extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law,” id. at 867. The Baker Court determined that
the Vermo nt Legislature co uld satisfy this constitutional resp onsibility either by including same-sex couples “within
the marriage laws themselves” or by creating “a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some equivalent statutory
alternative.” Id.
131

See, e.g., 1 H OMER H. C LARK, J R ., T HE L AW OF D OMESTIC R ELATIONS IN THE U N IT E D S TATES § 2.8, at
142 (2d ed. 1987) (“As recently as ten years ago it would have been inconceivable to deal seriously with the question
of the validity of marriages between persons of the same sex. The fact that a discussion of this subject must now be
included in a legal text testifies to the rapid and drastic social changes which have occurred in that period.”).
132

E SKRIDGE , supra note 1 15, at 10; see also Maura I. Strassb erg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. R EV . 150 1, 16 23 (199 7) (same); Baker, 744 A.2d at 906
(Johnso n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying Verm ont’s same-sex ma rriage prohibition as “a
vestige”).
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men are on the verge of winning . . . equal marriage rights.”133 It is “an inevitable
development.”134
The use of the increasingly canonical example of same-sex marriage provides some
indication of how the family law canon understates the distinctions that family law currently
draws between families. Some of the examples excluded from the family law canon make this
aspect of the canon’s construction even more clear.

2.

The Noncanonical Examples

Examples involving religion and examples involving disability are rarely mentioned
when legal authorities and legal scholars consider family law’s relationship to social inequality.
These examples highlight the continued distinctions that family law draws between families.
Consider, for instance, the example of the suppression of Mormon polygamy. This
example is hardly noticed in family law. The vast majority of the literature on the legal
suppression of polygamy analyzes the polygamy prohibition from the standpoint of religious
liberty.135 In part, this reflects the important role that antipolygamy laws have played in the

133

Evan W olfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the
Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. R EV . L. & S O C . C HANGE 567, 571 (1994).
134

Strassb erg, supra note 132, at 1623.

135

See, e.g., T HOM AS G. A LEXANDER , M O R M O N IS M IN T R A N SIT IO N : A H ISTORY OF THE L ATTER -D AY
S AINTS , 1890-1930, at 4 (1986) (“After moving to Utah, the Latter-day Saints had built a community which
conjoined church and state, politics, the economy, and society into one whole. . . . The Protestant majority in the
United States responded with a series of laws, court tests, and political activities designed to break the back of the
Mo rmon comm unity and reshape it in the image of the remainder of the United States. These culminated in the
passage o f the Edmunds (18 82) and Edm unds-T ucker (18 87) acts, which . . . provided for imp risonment of those
practicing plural marriage, and confiscated virtually all the church’s property. They insisted that the Latter-day
Saints conform to the norms of Victorian America, which allowed religious influence to be exercised on moral
questions but generally interdicted extensive church interfere nce— at least by religions considered deviant— in
political and economic matters.”); L E O N A RD J. A R R IN G T O N & D AVIS B IT T ON , T HE M O R M O N E XPERIENCE : A H ISTORY
OF THE L ATTER -D A Y S AINTS 184 (2d ed. 1992) (“A half-century and more of heated confrontation with the U.S.
gove rnment had taught Latter-day Saints the practical limits of religious life in A merica.”); E D W IN B R O W N F IRMAGE
& R IC H A R D C O LL IN M A N G RU M , Z ION IN THE C OURTS : A L EGA L H ISTORY OF THE C HU RCH OF J ESUS C H R IS T O F
L ATTER -D A Y S AINTS , 1830-19 00, at 130 (1988) (“In the hysteria of anti-polygamy sentiment, the Supreme Co urt
defined the scope of constitutionally protected religious activity in a narrow and distorted fashion. Thus, in deciding
whether polygamy was protected by the Constitution, America defined in general terms the extent to which religious
practices could stand aga inst the claim s of the state.”); R IC H A R D S. V A N W AGONER , M O R M O N P O LY G AM Y : A
H ISTORY 135 (1986) (“The framers of the Edmunds-Tucker Bill intended their legislation to destroy the Mormon
theoc ratic system .”); Orma L inford, The Mormo ns and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 U T A H L. R EV . 308, 328
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development of First Amendment jurisprudence on the limits of religious freedom. The Mormon
Church’s 1852 announcement that polygamy was an element of the Mormon faith sparked the
nineteenth-century campaign against polygamy,136 and the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld

(1964) (“Those who made the policy decisions came to accept arguments which justified anti-polygamy legislation
also as justification for destroying the entire way of life of a religious group. They seemed to proceed upon the
assumption that Mormons and M ormonism were synonymous with polygamists and polygamy, and once
governmental power to extirpate the latter was established, it justified a full-scale attack on the former. In making
this transition, Congress not only displayed faulty logic, but did violence to the principles upon which the exercise of
freedom d epends.”) (footnote o mitted); Jeremy M . Miller, A Critique of the Reynolds Decision, 11 W . S T . U. L. R EV .
165, 165 (1984) (“The sp ecific purpose of this paper is to prove that the United States Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Reynolds v. United States was wrong. . . . The wrong decision in Reynolds has cast a shadow on the
individual liberties for which this country has and does pride itself.”) (footnote omitted); Keith E. Sealing,
Polyg amists out of the Closet: Statutory an d State C onstitutiona l Prohib itions Aga inst Polygamy Are
Unconstitutiona l Und er the Free Exercise C lause, 17 G A . S T . U. L. R EV . 691, 695 (2001) (“[This article] argues that
the Fre e Exercise C lause p rotects religiously motivated p olygam y . . . .”); Rod ney K . Smith, Getting off on the
Wron g Fo ot and Back on A gain: A Reexa mina tion of the H istory of the Fra ming of the Religio n Clau ses of the First
Amendm ent and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 W AKE F OREST L. R EV . 569, 56 9 (1984) (“A
central thesis of this article is that the opinions in Reynolds and Everson have c reated seemingly interm inable
problems for the Court in deciding religious liberty issues under the aegis of the first amendment.”). For a history of
the antipolygamy movement that devotes more attention to the polygamy prohibition as a form of marriage
regulation, while still focusing on polygamy’s challenge to the limits of religious liberty, see SA R A H B ARRINGER
G O R D O N , T HE M O R M O N Q U E S TIO N : P O LY G A M Y A ND C ON STITU TION AL C O N F LIC T IN N INETEENTH -C E N TU R Y A MERICA
139 (2002) (“[T]he debate over polygamy highlighted the vital ways in which the ‘private’ law of marriage had
unde niably ‘public’ dimensions. Reynolds challenged the Court to articulate how the intersection of spiritual and
secular law in marriage was fundamental to all of political life, territorial, state, and federal. In response, the
Supreme Co urt drew together the threads that connected marriage to political life and law, holding that the
Mormons’ attempt to redefine the family for Utah Territory justified the intervention of the national sovereign.”)
(footnote omitted).
136

See H UBERT H OWE B ANC ROFT , H ISTORY O F U TAH 376 n.19 (San Francisco, History Co. 1890)
(desc ribing the anno uncement). For the federal antipo lygamy legislation e nacted in the w ake o f this announcement,
see An A ct to punish and prevent the P ractice of Po lygamy in the Territories of the United S tates and other P laces,
and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah (Morrill Act), ch.
126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862) (“[E]very person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any other
person, whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States, or other place over which the United States
have exclusive jurisdiction, shall, except in the cases specified in the proviso to this section, be adjudged guilty of
bigamy, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years . . . .”); An act in relation to courts and judicial officers in the
Territory of Utah (Poland Act), ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253, 254 (1874) (“A writ of error from the Supreme Court of
the United States to the supreme court of the Territory shall lie in criminal cases, where the accused shall have been
sentenced to capital punishment or convicted of bigamy or polygamy.”); An act to amend section fifty-three hundred
and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes (Edmunds
Act), ch. 47, § 1, 22 Stat. 30, 30 (1882) (“‘Every person who has a husband or wife living who, in a Territory or
other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, hereafter marries another, whether married or
single, and any man who hereafter simultaneously, or on the same day, marries more than one woman, in a Territory
or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of polygamy, and shall be punished
by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years . . . .’”);
An act to amend an act entitled “An act to amend section fifty-three hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,” approved March twenty-second, eighteen hundred
and eighty-two (Edmunds-Tucker Act), ch. 397, § 24, 24 Stat. 635, 640 (1887) (“No person . . . who shall be a
polygamist, or who shall associate or cohabit polygam ously with perso ns of the other sex, shall be entitled to vo te in
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federal antipolygamy laws against Mormons’ First Amendment challenges.137
Yet the polygamy prohibition is also a form of family law, and the example of the
suppression of Mormon polygamy directs attention to the continued distinctions that family law
makes between families. The polygamy prohibition remains in force in every state,138 and it is
unlikely to be overturned or modified. Indeed, virtually the only time that the polygamy
prohibition attracts any notice within family law at all is in the context of debates in which both
sides assume that the polygamy prohibition is justified and beyond reconsideration. Courts,139

any elec tion in said [Utah] Territory, o r be capable of jury service, or to hold any office of trust or emo lument in said
Territory.”); An Act To enable the people of Utah to form a constitution and State government, and to be admitted
into the Union on an equal footing with the original States (Utah Enabling Act), ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108
(1894) (“[Utah’s constitutional] convention shall provide, by ordinance irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of said State— First. That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and that no
inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person or property, on account of his or her mode of religious
worship: Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.”).
137

See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 50
(1890) (“The State has a perfect right to prohibit polygamy, and all other open offences against the enlightened
sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pretence of religious conviction by which they may be advocated and
practised.”); D avis v. Beaso n, 133 U .S. 333, 3 42-43 (1890) (“Ho wever free the exe rcise of religion may be , it must
be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as
properly the subjects of punitive legislation.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (18 79) (“[T]here
never has been a time in any State o f the Union when polygam y has no t been an offence against soc iety, cognizab le
by the civil courts and p unishable with more or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to
believe that the constitutional guaranty of re ligious freedo m was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this
most important feature of social life. . . . Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religio us belief and o pinions, they may with practices.”); see also Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d
1065, 10 68 (10th Cir. 1985) (“In Reynolds v. United States the Sup reme Court affirmed a criminal conviction of a
Mo rmon for practicing polygamy and rejected the argument that Congress’ prohibition of polygamy violated the
defendant’s right to the fre e exercise of religion. P laintiff argues that Reynolds is no longer controlling because later
cases have ‘in effect’ overturned the decision. We disagree.”) (citations omitted); Founding Church of Scientology
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[I]t is clear that the First Amendment does not protect
from regulation or prohibition all bona fide religious practices. . . . Thus the prohibition of plural marriage has been
upheld, even though the practice is a religious duty to some.”).
138

See sup ra note 2 7 and acco mpa nying text.

139

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003) (“[T]he plaintiffs [same-sex
couples] seek only to be married, not to undermine the institution of civil marriage. They do not want marriage
abolished. They do not attack the binary nature of marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of the other
gate-keeping provisions o f the marriage licensing law.”); id. at 969 n.34 (“[N]o one argues that the restrictions on
incestuo us or p olygam ous m arriage s are so dependent on the [sam e-sex] m arriage restriction that they too sho uld fall
if the [same-sex] marriage restriction falls. Nothing in our opinion today should be construed as relaxing or
abro gating the consanguinity or po lygamy p rohib itions of o ur marriage laws.”); id. at 969 (“W e con strue civil
marriage to m ean the voluntary unio n of two perso ns as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”); Lewis v. H arris,
No. M ER-L-15-03, slip op. at 60-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003 ) (“New Jersey statutes ban bigamous
marriages, co mmon law marria ges, ince stuous marriages, and ma rriages to persons adjudged to b e mentally
incompetent or with a venereal disease in a communicable stage. The governm ental interests in these restrictions
have been repea tedly recognized. . . . While a ba n on same-sex marriage d iffers from those listed above, nonetheless,
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judges,140 lawmakers,141 and scholars142 defend same-sex marriage prohibitions by comparing
them to prohibitions on polygamous marriage, or attack same-sex marriage prohibitions by
contrasting them to prohibitions on polygamous marriage.

the interest of the State in limiting marriage to mixed-gender couples is a valid and reasonable exercise of
government authority.”) (citations omitted).
140

See Lawrence v. Te xas, 53 9 U .S. 55 8, 59 0 (2003 ) (Scalia, J., dissen ting) (“State laws ag ainst bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are
likewise su stainab le only in light of Bow ers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.”).
141

See Federal Marriage Amendment (The Musgrave Amendment): Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 56 Before the
Sub com m. on the Constitution of the H ouse C omm. on the Jud iciary, 108th Cong. 39 (2004) (statement of Rep.
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Similarly, legal authorities and legal scholars rarely consider examples involving
disability in assessing family law’s relationship to social inequality. While there is a profusion of
scholarly material examining prohibitions on interracial or same-sex marriage,143 family law
scholars hardly mention laws that prohibit or restrict marriage based on disability. Although
statutes and practices burdening interracial adoption have attracted tremendous scholarly and
official interest,144 there is virtually no discussion in family law of the legal obstacles that
disabled people face in adopting children.
Excluding the treatment of the disabled from the ranks of family law’s canonical
examples directs attention away from the continued distinctions that family law draws between
families. Let’s begin with the legal regulation of disabled people’s marriages. Today at least
nine states impose statutory prohibitions or restrictions on marriages involving a mentally
disabled or mentally ill person that go beyond a simple requirement that the person be capable of
consent.145 In Kentucky, for example, a marriage “[w]ith a person who has been adjudged
mentally disabled by a court of competent jurisdiction” “is prohibited and void,”146 and people
who aid or abet such marriages are subject to criminal penalties.147 In Delaware, a marriage with
“[a] person of any degree of unsoundness of mind” is prohibited and voidable.148 In Vermont, a
marriage with “an idiot or lunatic” is voidable.149 In Mississippi, it is illegal for the circuit court
clerk to issue a marriage license to someone who appears to be “insane or an imbecile.”150
Official adoption practices and policies also seem to disfavor the disabled. Although the
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literature on adoption virtually ignores the subject, it appears to be the case that many state
adoption agencies consider disabled people to be categorically undesirable adoptive parents,
making it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for a disabled person to adopt a child through
the agencies.151
These laws and legal practices represent important instances in which family law
continues to draw distinctions between families, adding to the legal and social disadvantages
associated with being disabled. Yet, at this point, it should not be surprising to learn that
examples involving disability are not canonical in family law. The family law canon locates
almost every inequality in family law in the past rather than the present.
The remainder of this part considers some of the consequences of the canonical
understanding of the relationship between family law and social inequality, and explores how
challenging the construction of the family law canon can be the first step to changing the canon
and restructuring family law debates.

C.

The Consequences of the Canon and the Possibilities for Change: The Debate
over Divorce Law

The family law canon presents a distorted picture of family law that suggests that the
inequalities that may have once characterized family law are vanquished, and no cause for
present concern. This construction of the family law canon has enabled legal authorities enacting
and defending family law policies that might harm historically subordinated groups to contend
that family law no longer supports social inequality and need no longer be concerned about the
status and position of historically subordinated people.
Yet, as we have seen, there are aspects of family law that continue to sustain social
inequality. Contesting the way that the family law canon presents the relationship between
family law and social inequality is a first step toward changing the canon and altering the terms
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For a brief suggestion along these lines, see B ARTHOLET , F A M IL Y B O N D S , supra note 127, at 70-71
(“Screening for parental fitness is a basic part of the agency adoption process. . . . The system ranks prospective
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determined objective factors. . . . Single and older adoptive applicants — those in their late thirties and forties — are
placed lower on the ladder, along with people with disabilities. Gays, lesbians, and the seriously disabled are
generally excluded altogether.”).
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on which many family law debates take place. It makes clear that it is not a convincing argument
in a family law debate to assert that family law already upholds social equality securely. Equality
concerns cannot be assumed away like that. Instead, a relevant question in any family law debate
is whether the specific family law policy at issue is consistent with equality or not.
Consider the debate over divorce law, one of the most prominent recent debates to reflect
the influence of the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and social
inequality. Starting with California’s Family Law Act of 1969,152 state legislatures and state
courts across the nation have instituted a number of changes in divorce law. In making and
defending these changes, legislatures and courts have relied heavily on the canonical story of
coverture’s demise to argue that the law no longer needs to be concerned about women’s status at
divorce because family law now supports and upholds women’s equality.
California’s Family Law Act, for instance, replaced a divorce regime that granted divorce
only upon proof of marital fault and that favored the faultless spouse, who was usually the wife,
in dividing community property at divorce.153 Under the divorce law that the Family Law Act
established, none of the grounds for securing a divorce turn on marital fault,154 and community
property is divided equally upon divorce, regardless of each party’s fault or future earning
capacity. 155 Before the Family Law Act became law, the Judiciary Committee of the California
Assembly issued a report stating the legislative intent behind the act’s financial provisions.156
This report explained that divorce law no longer needed to be concerned about women’s status
upon divorce because of women’s “approaching equality” with men under the law and in the
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See, e.g., Assem bly Co mmittee Report on Assemb ly Bill No. 53 0 and Senate Bill N o. 25 2 (T he Family
Law Act), C omm ittee on J udiciary (Aug . 8, 1969), in 4 J OURNAL OF THE A SSE M BLY : L EGISLATURE OF THE S T A TE O F
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misap propriated assets, see id. § 48 00(2), or “econom ic circumstances wa rrant . . . awarding any asset to one party
on such conditions as the court deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property,” id. § 4800 (1).
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See Assembly Committee Report on Assembly Bill No. 530 and Senate Bill No. 252 (The Family Law
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market. As the report elaborated:
When our divorce law was originally drawn, woman’s role in society was
almost totally that of mother and homemaker. She could not even vote. Today,
increasing numbers of married women are employed, even in the professions. In
addition, they have long been accorded full civil rights. Their approaching
equality with the male should be reflected in the law governing marriage
dissolution and in the decisions of courts with respect to matters incident to
dissolution.157
The New Jersey legislature embraced a similar line of reasoning in 1971 in creating a nofault ground for divorce and providing for the equitable division of marital property upon
divorce.158 As a member of the New Jersey Divorce Law Study Commission later explained,159
the changes in New Jersey’s divorce law were grounded on the premise that family law no longer
made wives “the economic dependents of husbands” and therefore no longer needed to be
concerned about a woman’s position after divorce. Instead, New Jersey’s new divorce law
“assum[es] that marital partners are equal in all matters, including matters of family economics”
so that “[w]hen the marriage ends in divorce, such wealth as either of them has acquired during
the marriage is, with but a few exceptions, treated as an equitably divisible partnership asset.”160
Courts have also relied on the premise that women’s legal subordination under coverture
has been excised from family law in concluding that divorce law no longer needs to be worried
about divorced women’s status. They explain, for instance, “that the former complete protective
role of the court regarding alimony is no longer necessary” because “[t]he law formerly attaching
. . . subjection to the legal status of a married woman has been abolished either by legislation or
by the continuous pressure of judicial interpretation.”161 They insist that divorce law no longer
157
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needs to be concerned about limiting women’s economic vulnerability at divorce because it is a
“day of women’s emancipation,”162 in which women’s legal status is no longer “second class,”163
and married women now have “coequal status” with their husbands164 and a position “of
complete equality as partners sharing equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship.”165
They report that “the law has advanced to recognize the equal status of men and women in our
society,” and reason that divorce law should accordingly discard its former interest in “protecting
women” in favor of an assumption that spouses have equal status and equal bargaining power.166
They declare that women “now occupy a position of equal partners in the family relationship
resulting from marriage,” and conclude that divorce law should therefore no longer treat wives
“with compassion, tenderness and mercy.”167
In sum, the debate over the law of divorce helps reveal some consequences of the family
law canon’s construction. The family law canon suggests that any historical inequalities in
family law have been excised from the law and left behind in the past. This account has allowed
legislatures and courts enacting and defending changes in family law that might injure
historically subordinated groups, like women, to argue that the law can pursue such changes
without worrying about the status of historically subordinated people.
The debate over divorce also suggests how challenging the canonical understanding of the
relationship between family law and social inequality can be a first step toward changing the
family law canon and restructuring family law debates, altering what counts as a good reason and
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reforming how decisions are made. It helps make clear that a central argument on which
legislatures and courts have relied to explain and defend changes in the law of divorce, that
family law has already established women’s equality so no longer needs to be concerned about
women’s status and position, is inadequate and unconvincing. As we have seen, substantial
evidence within family law documents the persistence of principles and rules from common law
coverture.168 No state, for example, will enforce an interspousal contract for domestic labor,
which might allow a woman to accumulate separate economic assets during marriage that could
help support her after divorce.169 At least thirty-three states retain some form of the doctrine of
necessaries, which deprives a wife of a direct claim on her husband’s assets based on the wife’s
right to support during marriage.170
Indeed, these family law rules may help explain why the recent changes in divorce law
appear to have contributed to the downward economic mobility or absolute impoverishment of
many divorced women and their children.171 The prohibition on interspousal contracts for
domestic labor and the doctrine of necessaries help ensure that many married women acquire few
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separate assets during marriage, while performing labor that diminishes their future earning
potential in the market. In light of this legal and economic background, divorce laws that assume
that spouses have equal bargaining power in marriage and equal earning power at divorce may
frequently be insufficient to keep many divorced women and their children out of poverty.
Contesting the family law canon’s construction helps reveal, in other words, that the
inequalities in family law are not necessarily in the past. The changes that have occurred in
divorce law since 1969 may or may not be consistent with a commitment to women’s equality.
But legislatures and courts debating and instituting these changes cannot simply assume that
question away, by asserting that family law has already fully and finally established women’s
equal status. Social equality is an important goal for family law, yet announcing its achievement
is premature. Instead, a crucial question in any family law debate has to be whether the particular
proposal at issue is consistent with equality or not.
Let’s turn to the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and
federalism.

II.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND FEDERALISM

The family law canon insists that family law is exclusively local. This construction of the
family law canon suggests that a key issue in family law is whether the federal government can or
should begin to intervene in family law at all. The exclusion of federal law from the family law
canon has allowed legal authorities and legal scholars to oppose particular examples of federal
family law on the ground that any form of federal family law is unprecedented and inappropriate,
even where the authorities and scholars admit that the specific federal family law at issue would
otherwise promote admirable aims and purposes. Yet challenging the construction of the family
law canon uncovers the existence and extent of federal family law. It makes clear that the
relevant question in a family law debate is not whether the federal government can or should
make family law. It is whether any particular piece of federal family law is desirable on its own
terms, in light of its substantive merits and the potential (state or federal) alternatives.
This part explores the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and
federalism, and examines the canon’s distortions. It then turns to the recent debates over the
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Violence Against Women Act172 and the Defense of Marriage Act,173 federal statutes that legal
authorities and legal scholars have opposed on the ground that they constitute federal family law
and are categorically inappropriate for that reason alone. These debates reveal some of the
consequences of the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and
federalism. They also indicate how contesting the construction of the family law canon can be a
first step to changing the canon and restructuring the terms on which family law debates take
place. Challenging the exclusion of federal law from the family law canon helps to undermine
one of the most prominent arguments that legal authorities and legal scholars now use against
federal family law measures, pushing the opponents of these measures to explain their opposition
in new terms, if at all.

A.

The Exclusion of Federal Law from the Family Law Canon

One of the best ways to uncover the canonical understanding of the relationship between
family law and federalism is to consider which official legal sources, like statutes and judicial
decisions, are excluded from the family law canon and not recognized as family law. Making
this question intelligible requires a working definition of family law. After all, it would hardly be
noteworthy for the family law canon to exclude a statute or judicial decision that has nothing to
do with family law. There may be many possible definitions of family law. A serviceable one,
however, is that family law regulates the creation and dissolution of legally recognized family
relationships, and/or determines the legal rights and responsibilities of family members. To
observe that a statute or judicial decision meets this definition of family law is not to assert that
the statute or decision can be defined only as family law. Indeed, one of the problems with the
family law canon is that it treats family law as a wholly separate enclave, so that a law is either
entirely a matter of family law or entirely part of another legal category.174 The doctrinal
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boundaries around family law remain almost impermeable, while those between other legal
subjects, like torts, contracts, and property, are arguably weakening.175 However, law that falls
within my working definition of family law is operating as family law, even if it is also falls
within another body of law at the same time. Yet federal statutes and constitutional decisions
that meet a serviceable definition of family law are systematically excluded from the family law
canon and not recognized as family law.
It is commonplace for courts and judges to assert that family law is, and always has been,
entirely a matter of state government.176 The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in United States
v. Lopez (1995)177 and United States v. Morrison (2000),178 for instance, both use the notion that

that a particular rule of law regulates a single aspect of human action: Laws are described as about
“the family,” “crime,” or “civil rights” as if laws were univocal and huma n interac tion similarly
one-dimensiona l. . . . [C]ategorical federa lism relies o n such identification to lo cate authority in
state or national governments and then uses the identification as if to explain why pow er to regulate
resides within one or another governmental structure.
Judith Resn ik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 Y ALE L.J. 619, 6 20 (200 1).
Similar forms of analysis are also much in evidence in the family law canon.
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family law is exclusively for the states to buttress their relatively narrow interpretations of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, contending that any broader theory of
Congress’s commerce power must be rejected if it would grant the federal government
(supposedly unprecedented) authority to regulate family law. Morrison makes this point twice,179
and Lopez insists on the exclusive localism of family law no less than four times.180 Similarly,
the major reason the Court cited in Ankenbrandt v. Richards (1992)181 for affirming the existence
of a “domestic relations exception” to federal diversity jurisdiction, which excludes “cases
involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree” from federal court,182 was
the proposition that family law is, and has long been, exclusively a matter for the states.183
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‘Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic p roductivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, d ivorce, and child custody), for exa mple.’”) (citations om itted); id. at 615-16
(“Petitioners’ reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez,
be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.”).
180

See Lopez, 514 U .S. at 564 (“[U ]nder the G overnm ent’s ‘national produc tivity’ reasoning, Co ngress
could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law
(includ ing marriage, d ivorce, and child custody), for exa mple.”); id. at 564-65 (“J USTICE B REYER posits that there
might be som e limitations on Congress’ comm erce po wer, such as family law or certain aspects of education. The se
suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent’s expansive analysis, are devoid of substance.”) (citation
omitted); id. at 565 (“J USTICE B REYER focuses, for the most part, on the threat that firearm possession in and near
schools po ses to the educ ational proc ess and the po tential eco nom ic consequences flowing from that threat. . . . This
analysis would be equally applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct regulation of
education.”); id. (“Under the dissent’s rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rearing as ‘fall[ing] on
the commercial sid e of the line ’ because it pro vides a ‘valuable service— namely, to equip [ch ildren] with the skills
they nee d to survive in life and, more sp ecifically, in the workplace .’”) (citation omitted); see also id. at 585
(Tho mas, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems to me that the power to regulate ‘commerce’ can by no means enc omp ass
authority over mere gun possession, any more than it empowers the Federal Government to regulate marriage,
littering, or cruelty to animals, throughout the 50 S tates.”); id. at 624 (B reyer, J., dissenting ) (“To hold this statute
constitutional is not to ‘obliterate’ the ‘distinction between what is national and what is local,’; nor is it to hold that
the Commerce C lause permits the Federal Governm ent to ‘regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic prod uctivity of individual citizens,’ to regulate ‘marriage, divorce, and child custody,’ or to regulate any
and all aspects of education.”) (citations omitted).
181

504 U .S. 689 (1992 ).

182

Id. at 704.

183
See id. at 694-95 (“[W]e are unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been recognized for
nearly a century and a half . . . .”); see also id. at 715 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he unbroken
and uncha llenged practice of the federal courts since b efore the W ar Between the States of declining to hear certain
domestic relations cases provides the very rare justification for continuing to do so.”).
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Such assertions of family law’s exclusive localism are typical. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared that “the laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally
reserved to the states,”184 that “domestic relations [is] an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States,”185 that—even more emphatically—“‘[t]he whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.’”186 William Rehnquist, the Chief Justice of the
United States, has explained in his capacity as head administrator of the federal courts that family
law “ha[s] traditionally been reserved to state courts.”187 The Conference of Chief Justices, the
organization for the chief justices of the state courts, has insisted that family law “is not federal
in nature.”188 Family law treatises and family law casebooks likewise report that “the institution

184

Tra mmel v. United S tates, 44 5 U .S. 40 , 50 (1 980 ); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186
(1988) (“Instructing the federal courts to play Solomon where two state courts have issued conflicting custody orders
would entangle them in traditional state-law questions that they have little expertise to resolve.”); Santosky v.
Kra mer, 4 55 U .S. 74 5, 77 0 (1982 ) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If ever there were an area in which federal courts
should heed the admonition of Justice Holmes that ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic,’ it is in the area of
domestic relations. This area has been left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good reason.”)
(footnote omitted); De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) (“It has been a long established rule that
the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction upon the sub ject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony,
either as an original proceeding in chancery, or an incident of a divorce or separation . . . .”); Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. (21 Ho w.) 582, 584 (185 9) (“We d isclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subje ct of divorce, or for the allowance of alimo ny, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an inc ident to
divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and boa rd.”).
185
Sosna v. Iow a, 419 U .S. 39 3, 40 4 (1975 ); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of domestic relations
as ‘an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’” (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at
404)).
186

Elk Grove U nified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 , 2309 (200 4) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S.
586 , 593 -94 (1 890 )); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997) (same); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625
(1987) (same); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981) (same); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979) (same); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (same); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162,
167 (1899) (same ); In re Burrus, 136 U .S. 586, 593-94 (18 90) (same).
187

W illiam H . Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-E nd Report on the Fed eral Jud iciary, T H IR D B RANCH
(Office of Legislative & Pub . Affairs, Admin. Office o f the U.S. Co urts, W ashington, D .C.), Jan. 1992, at 1, 3
[hereinafter Rehnq uist, Year-E nd R eport]; see also Rem arks of Chief Justice R ehnq uist, reprin ted in 138 C O N G .
R EC . 6186, 6186 (1992) (same); Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence 7
(Sept. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (contending that “domestic relations disputes” “have
traditionally been within the province of the state courts”).
188
Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102 d Cong. 3 17 (199 2) (statement of Co nference of C hief Justices); Crimes of Violence Motivated By
Gen der: H earing Before the Sub com m. on Civil and C onstitutiona l Rights of the H ouse C omm. on the Jud iciary,
103d C ong. 82 (1994 ) (statement of Conference of Chief Justices) (same).
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of marriage is regulated by the states.”189
This exclusion of federal law from the family law canon covers many federal statutes that
regulate the creation and dissolution of legally recognized family relationships and/or determine
the rights and responsibilities of family members. Whatever else they do and whatever other
legal subjects they implicate, federal social security law, employee benefit law, immigration law,
tax law, Indian law, military law, same-sex marriage law, child support law, adoption law, and
family violence and abuse law are also forms of family law.
Consider federal social security law first. Although most known for entitling qualified
workers to old-age insurance benefits based on their histories of paid employment,190 the social
security program also distributes significant benefits to family members because of their family
status. Most notably, the social security program provides spousal insurance benefits to the
spouses, divorced spouses, and surviving spouses of qualified workers,191 and provides child’s
insurance benefits to the dependent minor children of qualified workers.192 These benefits turn
solely on the recipient’s family status, rather than the recipient’s work history. In fact, the social
security program requires people receiving spousal benefits to forgo any social security benefits
based on their own record of employment.193 While social security benefits based on work

189

S AM UE L G R E EN & J O H N V. L O N G , M A R R IA G E A N D F A M IL Y L A W A GREEMENTS § 1.1 0, at 13 (1984); see
also H A R R Y D. K RAUSE ET AL., F A M IL Y L AW : C ASES , C O M M E N T S A N D Q U E S TIO N S 19 (5th ed. 2003) (“U nlike
taxation and interstate comm erce, family matters are not among the enum erated pow ers of the federal government.
As a result, . . . in the United States, state legislatures have traditionally defined the family and enacted the laws that
regulate marriage, p arentage, divorce, family support obligations, and family prop erty rights. W hile fede ral courts
might, theoretically, exercise diversity jurisdiction over family matters, as a result of the so-called ‘domestic relations
exception’ to diversity jurisdiction and various ab stention doctrines, federal co urts have seldo m entertained family
law ma tters. Inde ed, the United States Sup reme Court has o ften repeated that ‘[t]he whole subjec t of the dome stic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State, and not the laws of the United
States.’”) (citation omitted ); W ARDLE & N OLAN , supra note 42, at 29 (“The regulation of domestic relations
historically has been, and today remains, primarily a matter of state law. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United
States has observed, not infrequently, that the ‘[r]egulation of domestic relations [is] an area that has long been
regarded as a virtually exclusive province o f the states.’”) (citation omitted ); id. at 839 (noting “the strong tradition
of deference to state expertise in matters of domestic relations”).
190

See 42 U.S.C. § 40 2(a) (2000).

191

See id. § 402(b) (wife’s and divorced wife’s insurance benefits), 402(c) (husband’s and divorced
husband’s insurance benefits), 402(e) (widow’s insurance benefits), 402(f) (widower’s insurance benefits). For the
origin of these benefits, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360, 1362-67.
192

See 42 U.S.C. § 40 2(d) (child’s insurance benefits).

193

See id. § 402(b)(1)(D ), 402(c)(1)(D), 402(e)(1)(D ), 402(f)(1)(D).
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history are calculated according to wages earned and amount of time employed,194 spousal
benefits are calculated based on the benefits to which the “primary” spouse is entitled.195
Spousal and child’s benefits under the social security program represent an important
right associated with family status. Indeed, only 39.0% of the women aged 62 or older who
received social security benefits in 2002 collected based on their own work histories. The rest
collected spousal benefits, either because their own work histories did not qualify them for social
security benefits (33.0%), or because the benefits they would have received based on their work
histories would have been smaller than the spousal benefits they could receive (28.0%).196
In part because the social security program creates such important rights tied to family
status, the program is also concerned with regulating the creation and dissolution of the family
relationships that will be legally recognized for its purposes. The social security program defines
who counts as a child, a spouse, a divorced spouse, or a surviving spouse in ways that build on,197
but significantly depart from, state definitions. For example, the social security program
recognizes the relationship between a qualified worker and his dependent minor child only if the
child is unmarried.198 Similarly, the social security program recognizes the spouse of a qualified
worker only if (with a few exceptions) the spouse has been married to the qualified worker for at
least one year or has a child with the qualified worker.199 The social security program recognizes
194

See id. § 415.

195
A spouse or divorced spo use can receive a spousal benefit that is up to 50% as large as the benefit the
primary spo use rec eives, see id. § 40 2(b)(2), 4 02(c)(3), and a surviving spo use can receive a spousal benefit that is
up to 100 % as large as the benefit that the p rimary sp ouse would have received, see id. § 40 2(e)(2)(A ), 402 (f)(3)(A ).
Similarly, children whose qualifying parent is alive can receive a child’s insurance benefit that is 50% as large as the
benefit the qualifying parent receives, and children whose qualifying parent is dead can receive a child’s insurance
benefit that is 75% as large as the benefit that the q ualifying parent would have received. See id. § 402(d)(2).
196

See O FFICE OF P OLICY , O FFICE OF R ESEARCH , E V A LU A T IO N , & S TATISTICS , S O C . S EC . A D M IN ., A NNUAL
S TAT ISTICAL S UPPLEMENT TO THE S OC IAL S E C U RIT Y B U LLE TIN , 2003, at 5.25 tbl.5.A14, G.8-G .9 (2004).
197

See, e.g., 42 U .S.C. § 416 (h)(1)(A)(i) (“An applicant is the wife, husband, widow, or widower of a fully
or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter if the courts of the State in which such insured
individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files an[] application, or, if such insured individual is dead, the
courts of the State in which he was dom iciled at the time of death, or, if such insured ind ividual is or was not so
domiciled in any State, the courts of the District of Columbia, would find that such applicant and such insured
individual were validly married at the time such applicant files such application or, if such insured individual is dead,
at the time he died.”).
198

See id. § 402(d)(1)(B ).

199

See id. § 416(b), 416 (f).
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a divorced spouse only if she was married to the qualified worker for at least ten years,200 and
(with a few exceptions) has not remarried.201 The social security program recognizes a surviving
spouse only if (with a few exceptions) she was married to the qualified worker for at least nine
months or had a child with the qualified worker,202 and she has not remarried before the age of
60.203 The Supreme Court has also indicated in an analogous case on the federal Railroad
Retirement Act that the social security program deviates from state divorce law in providing that
social security benefits are not community property to be distributed at divorce.204
The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),205 which regulates
private employee benefit plans with a combined worth of trillions of dollars,206 similarly
determines important rights that family members receive because of their family status. Since
1984, for instance, Congress has provided that surviving and divorced spouses have specific, but
limited rights to the private employee pension benefits of their former spouses.207 As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly found, this federal provision preempts state family law on the
designation of beneficiaries at death or divorce.208

200

See id. §§ 402 (b)(1)(G), 402(c)(1)(G ), 416(d)(1), 416(d)(4).

201
See id. § 402(b)(1)(C), 402(b)(3), 402(c)(1)(C), 402(c)(4). If the primary spouse dies, the divorced
spouse is sub ject to the same remarriage rules ap plied to surviving spo uses. See id. §§ 402 (e)(1)(A), 402(e)(3),
402(f)(1)(A), 402(f)(4), 416(d)(2), 416(d)(5).
202

See id. § 416(c), 416 (g).

203

See id. § 402(e)(1)(A), 402 (e)(3), 402(f)(1)(A), 402(f)(4).

204

See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U .S. 572, 573-77, 579 , 582-83, 585-87 (1 979).

205

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.

206

See Boggs v. Bo ggs, 520 U.S. 833, 84 0 (1997 ) (noting that “[t]he nine community property States” alone
“have some 80 million residents, with perhaps $1 trillion in retirement plans”).
207

See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.

208

See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001) (“A Washington statute provides that the designation
of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce. We are asked to decide
whether the E mplo yee Retirement Income Security Act of 197 4 (ERISA) pre-empts that statute to the extent it
app lies to ERISA plans. W e hold that it doe s.”) (citatio n omitted); id. at 151 (“[W ]e have not hesitated to find state
family law p re-empted when it conflicts with ERISA or relates to ERISA plans.”); Boggs, 520 U .S. at 835-36 (“W e
consider whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (E RISA) pre-empts a state law allowing a
nonp articipa nt spouse to tra nsfer by testame ntary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. . . .
W e hold that ERISA pre-empts the state law.”) (citation omitted).
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Federal immigration law also creates valuable rights tied to family status, and determines
who will count as a family member for its purposes. Most notably, the immigration law exempts
the “‘immediate relatives’” of United States citizens from numerical limitations on
immigration.209 The family law category of “‘immediate relatives’” is a creation of federal
immigration law, which defines “‘immediate relatives’” as children, spouses, some surviving
spouses who were married to the citizen for at least two years, and parents when the citizen is at
least twenty-one years-old.210 Federal immigration law further specifies who counts as a child or
a spouse. It provides, for instance, that the relationship between a father and his illegitimate
biological child will not be recognized unless “the father has or had a bona fide parent-child
relationship with the [child].”211 Similarly, federal immigration law does not recognize marriages
entered into “for the purpose of evading the immigration laws,”212 or marriages between two
people of the same sex.213 Such rules play a pivotal role in immigration law because the
immigration preferences accorded to the immediate relatives of United States citizens are so
powerful that these relatives accounted for 47.2% of all legal immigration in 2003, the largest
single category.214 The beneficiaries of other family-based immigration preferences accounted

209

8 U.S.C. § 115 1(b)(2)(A )(i) (20 00); see also O FFICE OF I M M I GR A TIO N S TATISTICS , U.S. D EP ’T
H O M E LA N D S EC ., 2003 Y EARB OO K OF I M M I GR A TIO N S TATISTICS 5 (2004).
210

OF

8 U.S.C. § 115 1(b)(2)(A)(i).

211

Id. § 11 01(b)(1 )(D); see also Ngu yen v. IN S, 53 3 U .S. 53 , 56-5 9 (2001 ) (upholding the co nstitutionality
of 8 U.S.C. § 1409, which “governs the acquisition of United States citizenship by persons born to one United States
citizen parent and one noncitizen parent when the parents are unmarried and the child is born outside of the United
States or its possessions” and “imposes different requirements for the child’s acquisition of citizenship depending
upo n whether the citizen pa rent is the m other or the father”); T HE E FFECTS O F G ENDER IN THE F ED ERA L C OURTS : T H E
F INAL R EPORT OF THE N IN T H C IRCUIT G ENDER B IAS T ASK F ORCE 114 (1993) (“An overt gender distinction is made
in the definition of the term ‘illegitimate’ child under the immigration and nationality laws . . . . An ‘illegitimate’
child may seek immigration benefits through, or on behalf of, his or her mother. He or she may seek immigration
benefits through, or on behalf of, his or her father, howe ver, only by establishing that a ‘bo na fide’ parent-child
relationship exists or existed.”).
212

8 U.S.C. § 115 4(c)(2).

213

See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a party to a same-sex
marriage does not count as a spouse under federal immigration law, even if state law recognizes the same-sex
marriage).
214

See O FFICE OF I M M I GR A TIO N S TATISTICS , supra note 209, at 7 tbl.A.
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for an additional 22.5% of legal immigration.215
Federal tax law, in turn, ubiquitously distributes rights and burdens based on family
status, and regulates which family relationships are legally recognized for its purposes. The
extent of federal tax liability, for instance, can turn significantly on whether the taxpayer is
married,216 and the tax law’s definition of marriage builds on, but differs from, state law. The
federal tax code considers a person unmarried if his spouse is a nonresident alien and considers a
person married if his spouse died during the taxable year.217 Federal tax law also grants
important benefits based on specifically recognized family relationships. It determines, for
example, which relatives count as dependents for purposes of entitling a taxpayer to a tax
deduction.218
Federal Indian law similarly governs the legal creation and dissolution of family
relationships. The Indian Child Welfare Act,219 for instance, structures the termination of
parental rights over Native American children and the adoption of Native American children.
The Act provides that a parent voluntarily terminating his rights to a Native American child must
consent to the termination in writing and before a judge who certifies that the parent understands
the consequences of his consent.220 The parent can withdraw his consent to the termination
within two years if the consent was obtained through fraud or duress.221 More strikingly, the Act
provides that “[i]n any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall

215

See id.

216

See, e.g., Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding “‘marriage penalty’” in federal
income tax code, whereby some married couples owe significantly higher taxes than they would owe if they were
unma rried); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2 d 89 6, 89 7 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (same ); see also id. at 897-98 (“[N]ot all
married couples are penalized taxwise by reason of their status. To the contrary, many, if not most, married couples
achieve co nsiderable tax savings through income -splitting on a joint re turn. . . . It is when both spou ses generate
somewhat comparable incomes that the benefits of income-splitting cease to exist. As a general rule, two-income
couples would bene fit from filing separately and using the tax rates applicable to single p erson s. They are not,
however, eligible to use these schedules, but are restricted to filing jointly . . . .”).
217

See 26 U.S.C. § 2(b )(2)(C)-(D) (2000).

218

See id. §§ 151 , 152(a)-(b).

219

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069.

220

See 25 U.S.C. § 19 13(a) (2000 ).

221

See id. § 1913 (d).
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be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the
child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian
families.”222
The federal law governing the United States military also creates rights and
responsibilities that family members have because of their family status, and determines which
family relationships the military will legally recognize. Federal law, for example, gives the
dependents of service members the right to receive medical and dental care based on their family
status,223 and defines which family members count as dependents for purposes of receiving those
benefits.224 The federal Survivor Benefit Plan gives the spouses, former spouses, and dependent
children of service members a right to pension benefits.225 These benefits also turn solely on
family status.226 Like the federal law providing health care to the relatives of service members,
the Survivor Benefit Plan includes detailed specifications about which family relationships it
recognizes.227
There are also a number of federal statutes that are even more manifest examples of

222

Id. § 1915 (a).

223

See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1 076-107 8 (2000 ).

224

See id. § 1072 (2).

225

See id. §§ 1447-1455.

226

Dependent children and spouses or former spouses who are younger than 62 when they become entitled
to the annuity receive a p ension benefit that is 55% as large as the service me mbe r’s benefit. See id. §
145 1(a)(1)(A ). Spo uses or former spo uses who are 62 o r olde r when they becom e entitled to the annuity generally
receive a be nefit that is 35 % as large as the service me mbe r’s benefit. See id. § 1451 (a)(1)(B).
227

A surviving spouse, for instance, can receive benefits under the Survivor Benefit Plan only if she has not
rema rried b efore the age of 55 , see id. § 1450(b)(2), and was married to the service member for at least one year, or
was married to the service m emb er at the tim e of his retirement, or had a child with the service mem ber, see id. §
1447(7 )-(9). The Survivor Benefit Plan recognizes the relationship between a service member and his dependent
child o nly if the child is unmarried. See id. § 1447 (11)(A)(I).
Paired with these fed eral statute s granting the relatives of military perso nnel significant benefits tied to their
family status, o ther federal laws gove rning the military regulate the respo nsibilities associated with fam ily status.
Federal law provides, for instance, that a service member’s marriage does not exempt him from criminal prosecution
for rap ing his wife, see id. § 920(a), although marriage is a defense to prosecution for “carnal knowledge,” a crime
based on having sex with someone younger than sixteen “under circumstances not amounting to rape,” id. § 92 0(b).
In addition, federal law indicates that a service mem ber’s m arriage or his parenthood does not give him the right to
commit violence against his spouse or child. For example, members of the military are prohibited from possessing
firearms if they have been convicted o f a domestic violence misdem eano r, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 9 22(d)(9), 922(g)(9),
922(s)(3)(B)(i), 925(a)(1) (2000), a crime defined to include violence committed against a spouse, former spouse, or
child, see id. § 921(a)(33 ).
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family law. Consider the Defense of Marriage Act,228 which defines “‘marriage’” for purposes of
all federal statutory and administrative law as “a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife” and defines a “‘spouse’” as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife.”229 This statute is emphatically unwilling to defer to state definitions of marriage. It
applies, moreover, across the full spectrum of federal law. As the House Judiciary Committee
that reported favorably on the act estimated, “[t]he word ‘marriage’ appears in more than 800
sections of federal statutes and regulations, and the word ‘spouse’ appears more than 3,100
times.”230
In addition, Congress has enacted many statutes structuring and strengthening a child’s
right to parental support.231 These statutes, for instance, use financial and other incentives to
require states to petition for the inclusion of medical care in child support orders.232 They specify
detailed procedures that states must adopt to facilitate the determination of paternity. 233 They
also make it a federal crime for a parent to willfully fail to pay child support for a child who lives
in another state, if the unpaid support has been due for more than a year or is for more than
$5,000.234
Similarly, there are a number of federal statutes that structure the termination of parental
rights and the adoption of children.235 We have already discussed the Indian Child Welfare Act,
228

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 10 4-199, 110 S tat. 2419 (1996).

229

1 U.S.C. § 7 (200 0).

230

H.R. R EP . N O . 104-664, at 10 (199 6).

231

See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub . L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1 975); Child Suppo rt
Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305; Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100 -485, 10 2 Stat. 234 3; Child Support Recovery Act of 19 92, Pub. L. No . 102-52 1, 106 Stat. 3403 ; Ted W eiss
Child Support Enforcem ent Ac t of 1992, P ub. L. No. 102 -537 , 106 Stat. 35 31; F ull Faith and C redit for Child
Support Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 (1994); Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200, 112 Stat. 645.
232

See 42 U.S.C. § 65 2(f) (2000).

233

See id. § 666(a)(5).

234

See 18 U.S.C. § 22 8(a)(1) (2000).

235

See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92
Sta t. 2 05 ; Ado ptio n A ssistance and Ch ild Welfa re Ac t of 1980, Pub. L. N o. 96-272, 94 Sta t. 500; H ow ard M .
Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4056; Small Business Job
Pro tection Act of 199 6, Pub. L. No. 104 -188 , §§ 1 807 -180 8, 11 0 Stat. 175 5, 18 99-1 904 ; Ado ption and S afe
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which regulates termination and adoption proceedings involving Native American children.236 A
provision of the Small Business Job Protection Act, which applies to adoptions that the Indian
Child Welfare Act does not cover,237 prohibits states and organizations that receive federal
funding from denying or delaying an adoption based on the race, color, or national origin of the
child or the prospective adoptive parent.238 Other federal statutes use federal funding to require
states to adopt specific rules for determining when existing parent-child relationships should be
protected, when parental termination proceedings should be initiated, and when adoption should
be pursued.239
Still more federal laws structure the rights that a family member has to be protected from
violence or other abuse by another family member.240 The Child Protection and Obscenity
Enforcement Act, for instance, makes it a federal crime for a parent to sell his child in interstate
commerce to someone who the parent knows will use the child in the production of
pornography.241 The Victims of Child Abuse Act requires various professionals to report child
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Prevention and Treatment and Ad option Reform Act of 1978 , Pub. L. No. 95-266 , 92 Stat. 205; Parental Kidnaping
Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568; Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98
Stat. 204; Child Abuse Amendm ents of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-45 7, 98 Stat. 1749; Child Abuse Prevention, Adop tion,
and Family Services Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 -294, 102 Stat. 102; Child Protection and Ob scenity Enforcement
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485; Child Abuse Prevention Challenge Grants Reauthorization Act of
198 9, Pub. L. No. 101 -126 , 103 Stat. 76 4; Victims of Child A buse Act of 199 0, Pub. L. No. 101 -647 , 104 Stat.
479 2; Child Ab use, D ome stic Vio lence, Ado ption and F amily Services Act o f 199 2, Pub. L. No. 102 -295 , 106 Stat.
187 ; Battered W ome n’s Testimony Act of 1992, P ub. L. No. 102 -527 , 106 Stat. 34 59; A n Act To amend the State
Justice Institute Act of 1984 to carry out research, and develop judicial training curricula, relating to child custody
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L. No. 10 3-17 3, 10 7 Stat. 199 8; Safe Ho mes for W ome n Act of 1994, P ub. L. No. 103 -322 , 108 Stat. 19 25; C hild
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063; Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No.
108-21, 117 Stat 650.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 22 51A (20 00).
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abuse,242 while specifically indicating that “discipline administered by a parent or legal guardian
to his or her child” does not constitute child abuse so long as “it is reasonable in manner and
moderate in degree and otherwise does not constitute cruelty.”243
The oft-repeated insistence that family law is exclusively subject to local jurisdiction and
control similarly excludes federal judicial decisions interpreting the United States Constitution
from the family law canon. Yet the same Supreme Court that has frequently declared the
exclusive localism of family law has also, through its decisions interpreting and enforcing the
federal Constitution, often structured how legally recognized family relationships are made and
dissolved, and determined the rights and responsibilities that family members have because of
their family status. Like the federal statutes already discussed, many of these federal
constitutional decisions fall into other legal categories as well. They are part of the jurisprudence
on substantive due process, for example, or equal protection. But these decisions are also forms
of family law. A few examples, taken just from the Supreme Court, should be sufficient to
provide a sense of the important family law contained in federal constitutional decisions and
excluded from the family law canon.
Consider first the many federal constitutional decisions structuring how legally
recognized relationships between parents and children are created and dissolved. These
decisions provide, for instance, that an illegitimate child must have more than one year in which
to establish a legal relationship with his biological father.244 They hold that a biological father
has no right to create a legally recognized relationship with his child if the child is born to
another man’s wife.245 They determine that parental rights can be involuntarily terminated only if
the parent is proven unfit by at least clear and convincing evidence,246 and that indigent parents in
termination proceedings do not always have a right to appointed legal counsel.247
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Other federal constitutional decisions regulate the rights and responsibilities that parents
and children have when their relationship is legally recognized. They establish, for example, that
a parent can place his child in private rather than public school,248 or remove his child from
school entirely in some circumstances.249 They give parents substantial control over the access
that third parties, including grandparents, have to a child.250 They provide that a parent’s right to
the custody of his child is not diminished by the parent’s interracial marriage.251 They structure a
parent’s authority to participate in his child’s decision to have an abortion, determining that
parental consent can be required as long as the child has the option of seeking judicial
authorization instead.252 They hold that a child can be subjected to child labor restrictions against
his parent’s wishes.253
Federal constitutional decisions similarly regulate the legal creation and dissolution of
marriage. They prohibit states from banning interracial marriage,254 for instance, or from
requiring people subject to child support orders to obtain judicial approval before they can
marry.255 They establish that laws governing the provision of alimony at divorce must apply
equally to husbands and wives,256 and that laws governing the provision of child support cannot
set different ages of majority for male and female children.257
Federal constitutional decisions also determine some of the rights that are, and are not,
associated with marriage. They provide that a husband has no right to notice of his wife’s
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decision to have an abortion, much less the right to override that decision.258 They establish that
a married couple has the right to use contraception without being subject to criminal
prosecution.259
Along the same lines, federal constitutional decisions structure the rights associated with
family relationships beyond marriage and parenthood. They hold, for instance, that a housing
ordinance cannot deny an extended family the right to live together.260
As should be clear by this point, all of these statutes and judicial decisions are examples
of family law. They regulate the creation and termination of legally recognized family
relationships, and/or determine the rights and responsibilities that family members have because
of their family status. The courts and judges who authoritatively declare that family law is
entirely local unreasonably exclude these statutes and decisions from the family law canon.
Let’s explore some of the consequences of this construction of the family law canon, and
consider how challenging the family law canon’s construction can be a first step to changing the
canon and altering the terms on which family law debates take place.

B.

The Consequences of the Canon and the Possibilities for Change: The Debates
over the Violence Against Women Act and the Defense of Marriage Act

The exclusion of federal law from the family law canon suggests that a crucial and
undecided question in family law is whether the federal government can or should make family
law. This exclusion has permitted legal authorities and legal scholars to oppose specific
examples of federal family law on the ground that any instance of federal family law is
unprecedented and inappropriate by definition, even where the authorities and scholars concede
that the particular federal family law in question otherwise advances worthy goals and purposes.
Yet as we have seen, federal statutory and constitutional law already regulates family
relationships, rights, and responsibilities. Indeed, federal constitutional requirements make
federal family law inevitable. The relevant question is not whether the federal government can or
258
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See Mo ore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 , 495-96, 503-06 (1 977) (plurality opinion).
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should make family law. It is whether any specific example of actual or proposed federal family
law is desirable on its own terms, in view of its substantive merits and the possible state or
federal alternatives. Challenging the exclusion of federal law from the family law canon helps to
reveal that one of the leading arguments that legal authorities and legal scholars now employ
against federal family law measures is logically unconvincing, pushing opponents of these
measures to defend their opposition on new grounds, if at all.
Consider, for example, the two most prominent recent debates to reflect the influence of
the exclusion of federal law from the family law canon. The first involves the civil rights remedy
in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),261 which the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison (2000).262 This remedy created a federal civil right
to be free from gender-motivated violence and entitled the victims of such violence to seek
money damages from their assailants in federal court.263 There were many reasons to conclude
that the remedy was not a form of family law at all, as it did not structure the legal creation or
dissolution of family relationships, or subject people to different rights and responsibilities based
on their family status. But VAWA’s civil rights remedy did seek to combat domestic violence
and marital rape, along with other forms of gender-motivated violence.264 Perhaps for this
reason, opponents of the civil rights remedy identified the provision as a form of family law.
Having done so, they attacked the remedy on the ground that federal intervention in family law
was unprecedented and categorically inappropriate. This argument was extraordinarily
successful.
Even before VAWA’s enactment, a wide variety of judges and judicial organizations used
claims about the inherently local nature of family law to secure limitations on VAWA’s civil

261
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rights remedy. The Conference of Chief Justices,265 the Judicial Conference of the United
States,266 and Chief Justice Rehnquist267 never challenged VAWA’s substantive goal of
combating violence against women. But the Conference of Chief Justices, the organization of
state chief justices, voted on January 31, 1991 to oppose VAWA’s civil rights remedy on the
ground that the remedy was a form of federal family law and family law “is not federal in
nature.”268 The Judicial Conference of the United States, the organization for federal judges,
followed suit in September 1991,269 after the Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based
Violence warned that VAWA’s civil rights remedy would involve the federal courts in “domestic
relations disputes” “that have traditionally been within the province of the state courts.”270 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, acting in his capacity as chief administrator of the federal courts, similarly
opposed VAWA’s civil rights remedy because it “could involve the federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes,” an area of “law that ha[s] traditionally been reserved to state
courts.”271
265

See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, supra note 188, at 317 (statement of Conference of Chief Justices) (“Obviously, there is a need to protect
wom en.”); Crimes of Violence Motivated By Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Ho use Co mm . on the Ju diciary, supra note 188, at 82 (stateme nt of Conferen ce of Chief Justices)
(same); id. at 84 (statement of Conference of Chief Justices) (“[T]he Conference of Chief Justices commends
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S. 15 . . . .”).
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This line of argument about the exclusively local nature of family law carried enough
weight that VAWA’s supporters were forced to reduce the scope of the bill’s civil rights remedy
significantly. The initial versions of the remedy, for instance, covered all violent crimes
“committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,”272 and presumed that every rape fell
into that category.273 But in 1993, the Senate Judiciary Committee felt compelled to restrict the
civil rights remedy to those crimes that would constitute a felony involving the risk of physical
injury,274 and that were “committed because of gender or on the basis of gender; and due, at least
in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”275 The revised bill did not define its new
“animus” requirement,276 but the requirement was clearly meant as a limitation. The legislative

cases out of federal courts because they do not understand “[w]omen and the families they sometimes inhabit” to be
nationally impo rtant. Jud ith Resn ik, “Natura lly” W ithou t Gen der: W om en, Ju risdiction, an d the Fed eral C ourts, 66
N.Y.U. L. R EV . 168 2, 17 49 (199 1); see also id. at 1766 (“W omen’s unexamined presence in the law and
jurisprudence of the federal courts bespeaks hostility to seeing women as legitimate participants in the national
world—in this context represented by the federal courts.”). This may be an accurate assessment of the federal
judiciary’s perceived self-interest. For my purposes, however, I am less interested in how the arguments that judges
and judicial organizations made against VAW A’s civil rights remedy reflected their perceived self-interest, and more
interested in how the preexisting construction of the family law canon meant that it would count as a convincing
argum ent against VA W A’s civil righ ts remedy to contend that the remedy was unpreced ented and inapp ropriate
because it wa s a form of federal family law . As we will see, when jud ges and jud icial organizations ad vanced this
argument—whether from self-interest, sincere belief, or most likely a combination of the two—it resonated
pow erfully with both Congress and the courts. See infra text accompanying notes 272-285.
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history indicated, for example, that the Senate Judiciary Committee no longer presumed that the
civil rights remedy would cover all rapes.277 In addition, the revised bill also clarified that
VAWA’s civil rights remedy did not give federal courts “jurisdiction over any State law claim
seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or
child custody decree.”278
Even these limitations, however, did not quell the argument that VAWA’s civil rights
remedy was a form of federal family law, and unprecedented and inappropriate for that reason
alone. After the modified bill became law in September 1994,279 the constitutionality of
VAWA’s civil rights remedy was soon challenged in court. These challenges relied heavily on
the premise that family law had always been and should always remain a matter of exclusively
local jurisdiction, and stressed the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Lopez, which repeatedly
identified family law as uniquely beyond the reach of Congress’s constitutional authority to
regulate interstate commerce.280 The challenges enjoyed significant success in the lower
courts.281 The Fourth Circuit, for example, held that VAWA’s civil rights remedy was

based on the victim’s gender, to injure the victim.”).
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authority of the sovereign states.”); id. at 1194 (“W hile VAW A ostensibly seeks to protect the rights of women who
are victims of gender-based violence, this court must again exp ress its deep co ncern that the Act will effectively
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unconstitutional in an en banc opinion that identified the remedy as a form of family law,282 and
insisted at least seven times that the federal government could not and had never intervened in
family law.283

allow domestic relations litigation to permeate the federal courts. Issues related to domestic relations are better
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Supp. 779, 793 (W.D. Va. 1996) (“Family law issues and most criminal issues affect the national economy
substantially and in turn have some effect on interstate comm erce. T hese to o have interstate travel implications.
However, to extend Congress’s power to these issues would unreasonably tip the balance away from the states. . . . In
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national economy, which in turn affects interstate commerce, then it would be inconsistent to deny the commerce
pow er’s extension into family law, most crimina l laws, and even insomnia.”), aff’d sub nom. Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4 th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes.’”)
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(“[T]he very findings on which appellants rely in this case would, themselves, justify not only section 1398 1, but
. . . . federal regulation , and even occup ation, of the entire field of fam ily law, includ ing divo rce, alim ony, child
custody, and the equitable division of pro perty.”); id. at 859 (“[T]he essence of appellants’ contention is that
Congress can regulate any problem solely by finding that it affects the economy and has not been fully remedied by
the States. . . . [I]f Congress has found that the States have failed to eradicate gender bias, a problem that is not
limited to violent crime but permeates the law generally, and family law in particular, then Congress need not
proscribe federal jurisdiction o ver the core areas of family law, but can extend supplem ental jurisdiction over these
areas, or eve n regulate them directly and perhap s exclusively, because issues of divorce, alimony, the equitable
division of prope rty, and child custody, like violent crime, indisputably have ultima te econom ic effects.”); id. at 888
(“If the co ngressional find ings cited here suffice to render section 1 398 1 a legitimate en forcement of the Fo urteenth
Amendment, then in effect the federal government could constitutionally regulate every aspect of society, even
including those areas traditionally thought to be reserved exclusively to the several States, such as general criminal
and dom estic relations law.”); see also id. at 896 (W ilkinson, C.J., concurring) (“VAW A’s civil suit provision falters
for the m ost basic of rea sons. Section 139 81 sc ales the last redo ubt of state gov ernment— the regulation o f dom estic
relations.”); id. at 899 (N iemeyer, J., concurring) (“At oral argume nt, the governm ent was presse d at some length to
articulate its position on how to define the line between a national interest subject to regulation under the Commerce
Clause and a local interest which is beyond the scope of Congress’ legislative power. It continually refused to accept
the challenge, leaving me with the clear impression that if the political pressure were sufficiently great, the
government would feel justified in maintaining the position that Congress could constitutionally regulate local
matters, such as divorces and, ind eed, even child custody p roceedings.”); id. at 930 (M otz, J., dissenting) (“Nor,
contrary to the ma jority’s contentions, does S ubtitle C directly supersed e or impe rmissibly infringe on the states’
authority to regulate family law matters. Do mestic matters may be add ressed in some cases brought under S ubtitle
C, but no state or official regulation is superseded as a result. Instead, Congress expressly limited the reach of
Subtitle C in deference to traditional areas of state expertise on family law matters.”).
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The Supreme Court also relied on the claim that family law is inherently and exclusively
local in striking down VAWA’s civil rights remedy. 284 The Court’s opinion in United States v.
Morrison never directly identified VAWA’s civil rights remedy as a form of federal family law,
presumably because of the difficulties involved in such an identification. But in holding that the
civil rights remedy exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, the Morrison
Court stressed twice that it had rejected more generous interpretations of Congress’s commerce
power because they would give Congress the (purportedly unprecedented) authority to regulate
“family law and other areas of traditional state regulation,” and any interpretation of Congress’s
commerce power had to be rejected if it would do that.285 The argument that federal family law
is unprecedented and inappropriate, which drew much of its strength from the exclusion of
federal law from the family law canon, played a key role both in securing limitations on
VAWA’s civil rights remedy and in shaping the decision that found even the modified remedy
unconstitutional.
The second prominent recent debate to reflect the influence of the exclusion of federal
law from the family law canon involves section three of the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
(DOMA).286 This provision defines “‘marriage’” for purposes of all federal statutory and
administrative law as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife” and
defines a “‘spouse’” as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”287 Unlike
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VAWA’s civil rights remedy, DOMA’s section three is clearly an example of federal family law.
The section structures the creation and dissolution of legally recognized family relationships, and
determines the rights and responsibilities that family members have because of their family
status. At this point, it should not be surprising to learn that the section has been attacked for this
reason alone.
Section three’s critics assume and assert that family law is inherently and exclusively a
matter of local jurisdiction, so that the section can be condemned simply because it is a form of
federal family law. This argument may be particularly bizarre in the context of DOMA’s third
section. After all, that section has such practical importance only because, as we have seen, so
many federal rights and responsibilities already turn on whether a couple is recognized as
married for purposes of federal law. Federal law, moreover, has a long record of defining legally
recognized marriages in ways that differ from state definitions.288 But legal authorities and legal
scholars have pursued the critique of DOMA as federal family law nonetheless, reflecting the
continuing power of federal law’s exclusion from the family law canon.
Before DOMA’s passage, section three’s critics in Congress contended “that the Federal
government has always relied on the states’ definition of marriage for Federal purposes, and that
it is unwarranted and an intrusion on states rights to change that practice now.”289 They warned
that federal intervention into the law of marriage would set a new and “dangerous precedent,” so
that “tomorrow it may be divorce, the third day it may be custody.”290
Since DOMA’s enactment, many legal scholars have continued and expanded on this line
of argument. They criticize section three on the ground that it is an “unprecedented federal
intrusion into the law of marriage” because, “[w]ithout exception, domestic relations law has
been a matter of state, not federal, concern and control since the founding of the Republic.”291
They explain “that our federalist system entrusts domestic relations, including marriage, to the
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states rather than to the federal government.”292 They report that DOMA’s third section is
“where the federal government defined marriage for the first time in U.S. history.”293 They insist
that section three represents “the first time in our history that Congress has interfered in an area
where any regulation is quintessentially a matter of state, not federal, concern -- namely, family
law and domestic relations.”294 This line of argument has yet to produce legislative action
repealing section three, or a constitutional decision striking the provision down. But lawmakers
and legal scholars take it to have significant force, and to be capable of convincing even people
opposed to same-sex marriage.295
Both the debate over VAWA’s civil rights remedy and the debate over DOMA’s section
three, then, reveal some additional consequences of the family law canon’s construction. The
exclusion of federal law from the family law canon has distorted and obscured what is at stake in
each of these family law debates. This exclusion suggests that federal family law is
unprecedented, and that a core issue to be resolved when a piece of federal family law is
proposed is whether the federal government can or should intervene in family law at all. The
exclusion permits legal authorities and legal scholars to argue, with considerable success, that
federal family law is categorically inappropriate, so that any form of federal family law should be
rejected for that reason alone.
The debates over VAWA and DOMA also suggest how contesting the way in which the
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family law canon is constructed can be a first step to changing the family law canon and
restructuring family law debates, altering what counts as a convincing reason and how decisions
are made. Uncovering the existence and extent of federal family law, which is now excluded
from the family law canon, helps make clear that the legitimacy of VAWA, or DOMA, or other
federal statutes cannot be logically undermined simply by identifying the statutes as forms of
family law. Even if these statutes are instances of federal family law, federal laws and
constitutional decisions have long regulated family relationships, rights, and responsibilities.
This does not establish that either VAWA’s civil rights remedy or DOMA’s third section
is well-advised, or that all of family law should be made federal. The substantive merits of any
example of federal family law, and the wisdom of establishing a national standard or facilitating
state variation in any specific instance, will vary in each case. But challenging the way that the
family law canon is constructed does reveal that the relevant question is the advisability of the
particular federal family law measure at issue. It makes clear, in other words, that arguments for
or against federal statutes like VAWA or DOMA need to address their particular merits or
disadvantages, and cannot simply rely on the premise that all of family law is and must be
exclusively local.
Let’s turn to the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and
welfare law.

III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND WELFARE LAW

The family law governing the poor is also excluded from the family law canon. In part,
this exclusion reflects the insistence on family law’s localism that we have already examined, as
many of the statutes and constitutional decisions that govern family rights and responsibilities in
poor families are federal. But there is also a larger phenomenon at work, involving both federal
and state law. When legal authorities identify a statute or situation as part of welfare law, they
presume for that reason that the rules governing family law do not apply, that a statute or
situation that falls within welfare law cannot simultaneously be part of family law.
The exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon has allowed legal authorities to
avoid explaining why the law applies very different rules to regulate poor families. Challenging
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the canon’s construction, however, reveals that many of the federal and state legislative programs
and judicial decisions now classified exclusively within the realm of welfare law are also forms
of family law, structuring the rights and responsibilities that family members have because of
their family status.296 It makes clear that the law is applying a different family law to govern the
poor and that the difference needs to be explained or eliminated.
This part explores the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and
welfare law, and examines its inaccuracy. It then turns to the recent debate over the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.297 The Personal Responsibility Act
regulates the familial rights and responsibilities of the poor in many ways that are directly
opposed to the law’s regulation of more affluent families. But the Congress that enacted the law,
and the courts that have upheld its most interventionist provisions, have never felt the need to
acknowledge that the act applies a different family law to the poor, much less to justify the
difference. The treatment of the Personal Responsibility Act illustrates some of the
consequences of the exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon, and indicates how
challenging the canon’s construction can be a first step to changing the canon and altering the
terms on which family law debates take place.

A.

The Exclusion of Welfare Law from the Family Law Canon

The evidence that welfare law is excluded from the family law canon is abundant. Family
law casebooks, for instance, routinely include no discussion of welfare law as a form of family
law. Consider, moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Dandridge v. Williams298 offers a
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good introduction.
The Supreme Court decided Dandridge in 1970, just a few years after cases involving
welfare law (long hampered by the poor’s systematic lack of access to counsel)299 began to reach
the Court.300 The Maryland regulation at issue in Dandridge established a ceiling on the welfare
benefits that any single family could receive, no matter how large the family.301 This meant that
family members’ rights turned on their family status and that impoverished parents with large
families had a powerful incentive to send some of their children to live in other families.302
Under the Maryland regulation, a child in a large family received no additional aid because he
was part of a large family already receiving the maximum benefit ($250 a month).303 If the child
left his original family and joined another, he could receive aid. The Dandridge Court, however,
identified the Maryland regulation as part of welfare law, and assumed for that reason that family
law was not implicated. “[H]ere we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field,”
the Court explained.304 The most relevant precedents, the Court concluded, “involved state
regulation of business or industry.”305
The Court confirmed Dandridge’s understanding of the exclusion of welfare law from the
family law canon in Lyng v. Castillo (1986).306 The federal statute at issue in Castillo established
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that the food stamp program, which provides food vouchers to poor families, would conclusively
assume in setting benefit levels that parents, children, and siblings who lived together constituted
a single household, and purchased and prepared their food together. More distant relatives or
unrelated people who lived together were not considered a single household unless they actually
did purchase and prepare food together.307 On its face, the statute determined benefits and
burdens associated with family status. It denied close family members, because of their family
status, the right to establish a legally recognized separate household without relocating. It gave
close family members, because of their family status, a tremendous incentive to restructure their
living arrangements so that they purchased and prepared food together because their food stamp
benefits would reflect that cost-saving assumption. By the time the Court decided Castillo,
moreover, it had already indicated that statutes “‘directly and substantially’” interfering with
family living arrangements burdened a fundamental right and triggered heightened judicial
scrutiny.308 But the Court identified the food stamp statute at issue in Castillo as a form of
welfare law. With that classification in place, the Court quickly dismissed the suggestion that
family law precedents might apply to the case, simply asserting that the food stamp statute did
not “interfere with family living arrangements” because it did “not order or prevent any group of
persons from dining together.”309 Castillo upheld the food stamp statute on the ground that it was
rationally designed, as welfare law, to further Congress’s interest in conserving funds.310
After Castillo, the Court insisted on welfare law’s exclusion from family law again in
Bowen v. Gilliard (1987)311 and Lyng v. International Union (1988).312 Bowen considered a
federal statute establishing that the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,
which provided means-tested welfare benefits to poor children and their caretaker relatives,
would conclusively assume in determining eligibility that all parents, brothers, and sisters living
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in the same home shared all of their income.313 The statute undoubtedly regulated the rights
associated with family status. It denied close family members, because of their family status, the
right to keep their income separate in a way that would be legally recognized. It gave close
family members, because of their family status, a strong incentive to send a family member with
a separate source of income (like a child receiving child support from a noncustodial parent) to
live in another family.314 But the Bowen Court analyzed the statute exclusively as welfare law
designed to “decreas[e] federal expenditures,”315 and immediately rejected the argument that the
judicial review directed at statutes that “‘intrud[e] on choices concerning family living
arrangements’” might be appropriate.316
The Court drew a similarly impermeable line between welfare law and family law in
International Union. That case considered a federal statute providing that a household could not
become eligible for food stamps while a household member was on strike and could not augment
the amount of food stamps it received if the household’s need increased because of a decline in a
striker’s income.317 This statute, like those in Dandridge, Castillo, and Bowen, determined the
benefits and burdens of family membership. It prevented family members from receiving food
stamps based on their family relationship with a striker, and it established that family members
could receive food stamps by excluding the striker from their legally recognized family.
Nonetheless, the International Union Court analyzed the statute solely as an example of welfare
law. Relying on Castillo, it dismissed the claim that the statute might interfere with family living
arrangements.318
In sum, the Supreme Court has long treated family law and welfare law as completely
separate categories. Although welfare law often structures the rights and responsibilities that
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family members have because of their family status, this family law of the poor is excluded from
the family law canon.

B.

The Consequences of the Canon and the Possibilities for Change: The Debate
over the Personal Responsibility Act

The recent debate over the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996319 reflects the influence of the canonical understanding of the relationship between
family law and welfare law. It reveals how placing welfare law in a wholly separate category
from family law has obscured the disparities between the family law governing the poor and the
family law governing wealthier families, permitting legal authorities to avoid offering an
explanation for these disparities. Contesting the family law canon’s construction, and
uncovering how welfare law can also be a form of family law, makes the different family law
regulating the poor manifest and the need to explain, or eliminate, this difference clear.
The Personal Responsibility Act ended the AFDC program and replaced it with
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), another federal-state program for providing
means-tested benefits to poor children and their caretaker relatives.320 Like AFDC before it,
TANF importantly structures familial rights and responsibilities in poor families, often in ways
diametrically opposed to the law’s regulation of familial rights and responsibilities in more
affluent families. For instance, the Personal Responsibility Act permits states participating in the
TANF program to enact “family cap” provisions.321 These provisions, which twenty-three states
have adopted,322 establish that a family will not receive additional benefits under TANF to cover
the needs of any child born while the family is already in the TANF program. Family cap
provisions are clear forms of family law, determining the rights of family members based on their
family status: Under a family cap provision, a child born into a family receiving TANF is not
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entitled to aid because he is related to that family.
As we have seen, family law is frequently reluctant to intervene into decisions about
whether to have a child or how to structure family living arrangements.323 Yet the congressional
supporters of the Personal Responsibility Act never felt the need to explain why it was
appropriate for the act to deviate so sharply from the rules and norms otherwise thought suitable
for family law. Indeed, they never mentioned family law precedents or principles as relevant to
the Personal Responsibility Act at all. Instead, they simply defended the Personal Responsibility
Act as part of a welfare system designed to promote “self-sufficiency”324 and “self-reliance,”325
and to end “dependence” “on government benefits.”326
Similarly, all of the courts that have reviewed the family cap provisions have classified
them exclusively as welfare law, and refused to acknowledge their family law aspects, to apply
family law precedents, or to explain why different family law rules are appropriate for poor
families. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, upheld New Jersey’s family cap on the
ground that it was designed to promote “self-sufficiency and decreased dependency on
welfare,”327 and simply did not address the legal questions raised by a program that distinguishes
between children based on their parents’ conduct.328 The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, also
upheld New Jersey’s family cap provision, relying on Dandridge to deflect the argument that the
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family cap should be evaluated as a law that affects family rights.329 The Indiana Court of
Appeals reviewed an Indiana family cap provision that permits a family to avoid the effect of the
family cap by sending additional children born while the family is receiving TANF to live
elsewhere.330 This provision not only determines a child’s rights based on the family to which he
is related, it allows a parent to increase a child’s rights by transferring the child to another family.
The Indiana court, however, analyzed the law solely as a example of welfare legislation designed
to promote “self-sufficiency.”331 It dismissed the family cap’s impact on family structure as
“incidental” at best and refused to employ the heightened judicial scrutiny generally applied to
laws that affect family structure.332
The debate over the Personal Responsibility Act, and its authorization of family caps,
reveals some more consequences of the family law canon’s construction. This construction, by
placing welfare law and family law in entirely distinct legal categories, has helped legal
authorities avoid explaining why different rules should govern familial rights and responsibilities
in poor families. Challenging the family law canon’s construction, and establishing that welfare
law can also be family law, helps reveal the differences in family law’s treatment of poor families
and make clear the need to explain these differences, or eliminate them.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the family law canon importantly determines what is classified as
family law, what counts as a good reason or a convincing argument in a family law debate, what
explanations must be offered, and what need not be explained. Yet the family law canon
misdescribes both the content of family law and its animating tenets, distorting how legal
authorities and legal scholars understand family law in a way that can distort their judgments
about particular family law debates. Indeed, the family law canon highlights an aspect of canons
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that has received too little attention in the scholarship on the literary and constitutional law
canons: the practical effects that a canon can have in the real world. Challenging the family law
canon’s construction—subjecting to scrutiny and doubt what currently functions at the level of
common sense—is the first step toward changing the family law canon and restructuring the
terms on which family law debates take place.
The next steps lie ahead of us. By definition, the family law canon cannot be changed
immediately by individual fiat or lone scholarly argument. Inherent in the concept of the family
law canon is that it consists of ways of thinking about family law that are widely shared by legal
scholars and especially by legal authorities. Legal authorities and legal scholars create the family
law canon, and the family law canon in turn shapes how these authorities and scholars
understand family law. The canonical ways of thinking about family law are often so taken for
granted that legal authorities and legal scholars accept them as beyond criticism or reappraisal. If
I have convinced you that much in the family law canon should be altered, we must now consider
how changing the family law canon might be accomplished as a practical matter.
In thinking about concrete mechanisms for changing the family law canon, it is useful to
distinguish between the various actors who create and maintain the family law canon, and the
various contexts in which the family law canon is constructed and enforced. For example, legal
authorities like legislators and judges have the most control over the family law canon. Their
statutes and judicial opinions have inherent and independent legal force, whether or not legal
scholars or legal practitioners agree with them. For this reason, however, it may be difficult for
scholars, practitioners, or members of the general public to change how legal authorities
understand the family law canon. Given the specific institutional difficulties associated with
altering what legal authorities think and do about the family law canon, an effort to reshape the
family law canon may be most effective if it begins with family law scholars and the process by
which we transmit the family law canon to our students and successors.
Legal scholars can work to change the family law canon by helping to guide the next
generation to understand family law in different ways, which should ultimately lead this
generation to make different judgments about family law disputes. The academic community’s
scholarship, for instance, helps to create, shape, and perpetuate the family law canon. One step
that family law scholars can take to change the family law canon is to join the project that this
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Article has begun and to generate more scholarship that subjects the family law canon to
examination and appraisal, question and scrutiny.
Perhaps more importantly, family law scholars can also work to reshape the family law
canon through our teaching. How family law is taught—what texts and perspectives are included
and excluded, what stories and examples are employed—helps to determine how the next
generation of lawyers, including some future judges, legislators, and legal scholars, will
understand family law and its governing tenets. For example, family law courses, and the family
law casebooks that shape the content and focus of many family law courses, can be constructed
to assume and affirm the canonical understanding of the relationships between family law and
social inequality, family law and federalism, and family law and welfare law. In fact, the family
law casebooks that are currently available generally endorse and reinforce the existing family law
canon with little, if any, explicit deliberation. They note, for instance, that common law
coverture principles no longer govern the law of marriage,333 that common law property norms no
longer govern the law of parenthood,334 and that family law is inherently local.335 They include
no discussion of welfare law as a form of family law.336 Such support for the family law canon is
hardly surprising. After all, the family law canon consists of ways of thinking about family law
that are widely held. In addition, much of the power of the family law canon lies in its ability to
operate at the level of common sense, so that it seems to require no explanation or
reexamination.
But our family law courses, and our construction of the family law casebooks that guide
large numbers of family law courses, provide an invaluable opportunity to subject the family law
canon to question and to advance the process of altering it. Family law courses and casebooks
can be restructured to reveal, scrutinize, and challenge the family law canon. These courses and
casebooks can critique the canonical understanding of the relationship between family law and
social inequality, for example, and uncover the persistence of inequality in family law. They can
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explore how the construction of the family law canon has permitted legal authorities debating
and enacting family law policies that might injure historically subordinated groups to argue that
family law no longer supports social inequality and need no longer be concerned about the status
of historically subordinated people. Family law courses and casebooks can also examine the
existence and extent of federal family law, and discuss how the exclusion of federal law from the
family law canon has rendered every example of federal family law, whatever its particular
merits, vulnerable to attack. Family law courses and casebooks can similarly study welfare law
as a form of family law, and draw attention to the ways in which the exclusion of welfare law
from the family law canon has allowed legal authorities to avoid explaining why different rules
govern the familial rights and responsibilities of the poor.
Changing the family law canon by intervening in the process of the canon’s
intergenerational transmission will be a lengthy and demanding task. But the effort is well
worthwhile because the potential benefits are enormous. We can begin with our own scholarship
and our own teaching.
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